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In the light of the British referendum on EU membership on 23 
June, the Centre for British Studies of the Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin organised a series of public lectures on the future of the UK 
during the summer term 2016. Despite some forebodings, the 
outcome of the referendum still came as a harsh surprise. Brexit 
affects the Centre and its students professionally and personally. 
Whilst these are exciting times for scholars of British studies, we 
hope that our good relations to the UK can be maintained. 
The lecture series allowed us to follow the recommendations of our 
advisory board to produce a publication on the recent political 
developments in British politics. This short book is based on the 
public talks of our lecture series. 
As part of the KOSMOS Dialog ‘Devolution in the UK’, funded by 
the university’s Future Concept through the Excellence Initiative, I 
was able to invite Paul Cairney, Neil McGarvey and Arjan Schakel 
to Berlin for the purpose of academic exchange. I would like to 
thank them for their input to my own research, as well as all 
speakers and correspondents for their talks and their insightful 
chapters. Special thanks go to Neil McGarvey for his 
encouragement to turn the lecture series into a book. Finally, I’d 
like to express my gratefulness to Sandra van Lente for designing 
the book, and Catherine Smith and Madalina Luca for their 
editorial support. 
During most of the lecture series, the outcome of the referendum 
was not clear. Now the break with the European Union has become 




Although this publication has been highly responsive to the current 
developments, the conditions and implications of Brexit are 
constantly changing. Nonetheless, the book offers a set of concise 
overviews on the various internal and external division in British 
society and politics. It comments on causes and consequences of 
the referendum to provide explanations and some guidance for the 
interested follower of British and European politics. 
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1. Between Internal and External Divisions
Marius Guderjan 
[…] we believe in the Union, the precious, precious 
bond between England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland [...] we believe in a union not just 
between the nations of the United Kingdom but 
between all of our citizens – every one of us – whoever 
we are and wherever we’re from. 
Theresa May, 7 July 2016 
British EU Membership and the External Division 
The relationship with the EU has always been uneasy and 
characterised by conflict since the first two applications of 
membership in the European Economic Community in 
1961 and 1967 that were both vetoed by Charles de Gaulle. 
When, in 1973, the UK eventually was allowed to join the 
club, and people confirmed this subsequently in the first 
nationwide referendum in 1975, Britain signed up for an 
economic project and not for a political union. Hence, the 
‘honeymoon’ did not last long. The Conservative party 
and Margaret Thatcher initially supported EU 
membership, but during the 1980s Euroscepticism grew 
in her party and subsequently in the 
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population. During her rule Thatcher became more hostile 
towards the European Community over disputes about 
British financial contributions and the reform of the Common 
Agriculture Policy. 
British exceptionalism has been further underlined by opt-
outs of major policy areas with every European treaty since 
Maastricht (except for the Nice Treaty). The UK did not join 
the Economic and Monetary Union in 1992, Justice and Home 
Affairs – since the Lisbon Treaty the Area of Freedom and 
Justice – the Schengen Area in 1997 and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2007. Under 
Tony Blair the British Government adopted a more pro-active 
and cooperative approach to the EU. However, the UK, Blair 
was reluctant to promote a strong European outlook to avoid 
confrontations with the Eurosceptic media. 
Even though David Cameron did not mean to take UK out of 
the EU, unintentionally he has led the UK to the ultimate opt-
out. Hence, on the day after the referendum he announced 
his resignation as Prime Minister with the words ‘I think the 
country requires fresh leadership to take it in this direction’. 
Looking at his record, until close to the referendum when he 
negotiated a ‘better for the UK’ and campaigned for Remain, 
he had done a good job in steering his country into Brexit. 
When Cameron became Tory leader, he urged his party to 
stop ‘banging on about Europe’. But his continuing 
concessions to the Eurosceptic wing of his party has kept the 
issue alive and triggered further demands. In 2009, the 
Conservative Party withdrew itself from the European 
People’s Party, which isolated the party in the European 
Parliament and damaged its influence over EU policies. After 
the Tories came to power in 2010, Government passed 
the European Union Act 2011, which foresees a nationwide 
referendum on further transfer of powers and future 
amendments of European Treaties. 
In the same year, Cameron upset the majority of European 
leaders by vetoing the Fiscal Compact (formally the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union) in the European Council. In order to respond 
to the sovereign debt crisis, the Euro-states had to adopt the 
Fiscal Compact outside the existing treaty framework of the 
EU. Except for the UK, the Czech Republic and Croatia, which 
only joined the EU in 2013, all Member States ratified the 
Fiscal Compact. In his Bloomberg speech in 2013, Cameron 
claimed: ‘I am not a British isolationist. I don’t just want a 
better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too’, 
but his actions had shown a different picture. 
To unite his party and fight off UKIP, Cameron promised to 
negotiate better terms of EU membership and a referendum 
on British membership by the end of 2017. After his re-
election in 2015, a referendum became unavoidable. 
Cameron called for a fairer, more flexible and more 
competitive EU, but, except for limiting immigration, he had 




Nonetheless, he had to deliver some results from 
negotiations with the EU that allowed him to campaign for 
Remain. His position in the referendum, he threatened, 
would depend on the concessions to Britain. During his 
diplomatic mission across Europe, European leaders were 
generally open to provide Cameron with a success that he 
could sell at home to his Eurosceptic backbenchers and to the 
people. 
In February 2016, Cameron handed a listed four demands to 
Council President Donald Tusk: a four-year benefit freeze for 
EU-immigrants; a safeguard from decisions by Euro-insiders; 
economic competitiveness through cutting red-tape and 
negotiating new free-trade agreement with third parties; and 
an opt-out of the commitment to an ‘ever closer union’ and 
vetoing powers to national parliaments. Whilst Cameron was 
overall successful in the last three of his demands, with 
competitiveness being the least controversial, he was not 
given any concessions that would undermine the 
fundamental principle of the free movement of people. The 
best he got was an ‘emergency brake’ that restricts access of 
EU-immigrants to social benefits over a four-year period of 
time. However, Member States have to prove that the 
capacity of their welfare system are over-stretched, the 
European Council needs to decide on this matter in 
unanimity, and the brake only applies for a maximum of 
seven years, not 13 as originally demanded. 
13 
 
The deal that Cameron got during the European Summit on 
18-19 February did not foresee substantial reforms or hand 
back powers to the UK. Without a clear vision for reforms that 
could be supported by all Member States, the concessions 
were largely symbolic and it had not been clear how relevant 
they were in practice. The deal was meagre but it allowed 
Cameron to position himself at the head of the Remain 
campaign. On 20 February, Government announced the 
referendum on British EU membership for 23 June. The result 
of that referendum is well known, across the UK 51.9 per cent 
voted for Leave and 48.1 per cent for Remain. Cameron’s 
successor Theresa May has announced on 2 October 2016 
that the British Government will trigger Article 50 of the 
Treaty of the European Union in March 2017 starting the 
official negotiations about the terms of Brexit. 
The close result in the referendum has revealed a deep 
division in the British population. This divide is only to a 
limited extend about the different attitudes towards EU 
membership and regaining sovereignty. These issues have 
not been high in electorates priorities. Britain is divided 
across multiple dimensions – socially, geographically, 
ethnically and politically. The United Kingdom of 2016 is only 





Socio-Economic and Geographic Divisions 
Some commentators have pointed towards a division 
between outward looking modernists and traditionalists who 
long to return to a glorified past (Easton 2016), but the 
underlying social tensions are much deeper and more serious. 
An analysis of the referendum shows that young, educated 
and affluent people were by far more in favour for staying in 
the EU than older and more deprived voters (YouGov 2016). 
Young people were, however, less likely to enter the poll 
stations (BBC 2016). 
A closer look at the referendum’s geography also 
demonstrates that in England striving cities, like London, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol and Leeds, voted to remain, 
whereas rural and suburban constituencies opted by a 
majority for Leave. It is not only the ‘left behind’ who voted 
for leave and one can make the case that market towns are 
particularly affine to conservatism and traditions. And yet, 
the referendum unravelled the economic cleavages between 
prosperous city regions and peripheral ‘left-behind’ places 
with little prospect of overcoming their desolation. South 
Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Lancashire are among the 
poorest areas in North West Europe (Inequality Briefing 
2014). Here, the leave vote was particularly high with 75.6 per 
cent in Boston and 73.6 per cent in South Holland (both 
Lincolnshire); 69.0 per cent in Doncaster, 68.3 per cent in 
Barnsley and 67.9 per cent in Rotherham (Yorkshire); 67.5 per 
cent in Blackpool, 66.6 per cent in Burnley and 66.2 per cent 
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in Hyndburn (Lancashire). Driving through these districts in 
the run up to the referendum, you could see the St George 
flag widely displayed expressing a desire to restore national 
pride in uncertain times. 
While public investments have targeted metropolitan areas, 
austerity policies have been particular hard for local 
authorities that rely heavily on public spending. As chancellor 
of the exchequer, George Osborne, focused on strengthening 
cities likely to generate economic growth. Communities in 
particular need suffered disproportionally from the cuts of 
social benefits and the closure of leisure centres, libraries, 
museums and bus services. As one Leave supporter from 
Blackpool told the Guardian: ’It was nice to give the 
metropolitan elite a bit of a kicking. There’s more to the UK 
than just central London.’ (Pidd 2016) 
The vote differed not only across urban and rural areas, the 
Southwest vis-à-vis the East and the North, even local 
communities are split into those who understand 
globalisation and European integration as an unpreceded 
opportunity to travel and advance and those lacking the 
capacities and mobility to enjoy this privilege. The external 
division, the inward looking mind-set, goes hand in hand with 
such internal divisions that have been a long time in the 
making. If you are young, middle class and graduated you 
were far more likely to support Remain than older members 
of the working class or the precariat. After the referendum, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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(2016) released a review expressing ‘serious concern about 
the impact of regressive policies on the enjoyment of 
economic and social rights in the UK […] the Committee 
concludes that austerity measures and social security reform 
breach the UK’s international human rights obligations.’ 
Disadvantaged and marginalised peoples, low income 
families, children, persons with disabilities, minority groups 
and single parent families are particularly affected by 
poverty. It is not only people without employment but the 
‘working poor’ who suffer deprivation because the national 
minimum wage zero-hours contracts do not ensure a ‘decent 
standard of living’ (ibid.). 
When in 2011 riots took place in London, Birmingham, 
Manchester, Liverpool and other cities, the UK Government 
did not engage in a sensitive debate on the socio-economic 
causes for the outbreaks, but instead, imposed harsh 
measures on the rioters. In her first speech as Prime Minister 
of the UK, Theresa May drew the right conclusion of the out 
vote by emphasising the need to build a more socially just 
Union. She recognises that ‘if you’re born poor you will die on 
average nine years earlier than others […] if you’re a white 
working class boy you’re less likely than anybody else in 
Britain to go to university […] You have a job, but you don’t 
always have job security…You can just about manage, but 
you worry about the cost of living and getting your kids into a 
good school.’ How May and her Government will put these 
realisations into effective policies remains to be seen. Whilst 
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she promised to protect worker’s rights after Brexit, she also 
plans to allow the creation of new grammar schools which 
can chose their students and thereby neglect children from 
poorer households. The British economy faces tough times, 
which will make it difficult to invest in public welfare. 
Ethnic Divisions 
Among the ‘left-behind’ populist movements, like UKIP, gain 
ground by providing simple answers to complex questions. 
Both Nigel Farage’s Leave.EU and the more moderate Vote 
Leave, supported by Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Gisela 
Stuart, fought ‘to take back control of our country’, and 
primarily control of the borders. Prior to the referendum, 
limiting immigration had been a top priority for voters 
(Jordan 2015). The Leave campaign nurtured and exploited a 
hostile climate for immigrants particularly from eastern 
Europe and the Middle-East, but also for non-white 
communities that have lived in the UK for generations. 
Labour MP Jo Cox who was not only compassionately 
supporting Remain but also the representative of an 
ethnically diverse constituency. She stood up for mutual 
tolerance and was engaged in fighting anti-Muslim attacks, 
which have risen by about 80 per cent in 2015. Her murder on 
16 June 2016 by the right-wing extremist Thomas Mair, who 
shouted ‘Britain First’ as he attacked Cox, left many in shock 
18 
and led to the suspension of campaigning for two days, but 
it did not stop the xenophobic sentiment among the Leave 
campaign. An hour before her death, UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage launched the infamous Breaking Point poster that 
warned of the stream of Syrian refugees by stating ‘we 
must break free of the EU and take back control of our 
borders’. 
In most cases it may be wrong to accuse Leave voters 
of xenophobia – older generations of immigrants also 
support the stop of further intakes. Some areas have 
experienced a rapidly changing demography and severe 
economic and cultural challenges since citizens from 
East European countries became fully eligible to the 
Free Movement of People in 2004. Except for the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden, all other Member States temporarily 
restricted labour market access for new members. The 
native-immigrant divide is, nonetheless, real and many 
immigrants feel more aware of their outsider status now. 
The nasty tone of the Leave camp towards the issue of 
immigration has encouraged more outspoken 
xenophobia. Shortly after the referendum through 
England there have numerous reports of verbal abuse, 
xenophobic social media commentary, anti-migrant 
leaflets and a small number of physical attacks on Muslim, 
black and Asian immigrants. In the first week after 
the referendum, the police reported 331 hate crimes, five 




Although it is not yet clear how Brexit will affect the status of 
EU and non-EU immigrants in the UK, limiting immigration is 
a priority in the Government’s negotiation with the EU. If 
Britain kept access in the Single Market as part of the 
European Economic Area, like Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, 
it would have to accept the principle of free movement of 
people. Various UK ministers, including Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, however, have suggested measures that would 
discriminate foreign workers in British companies, such as a 
‘naming and shaming’ companies with the highest proportion 
of non-British staff. The UK has in the past served as a model 
for multiculturalism, anti-discrimination and integrative 
policies. This image is under threat, and it will require clear 
political messages speaking out for ethnic diversity to fight 




The vote to leave the EU was driven by internal not by 
external politics. People who usually stay absent from the 
polling station took the unique opportunity to ‘give the 
Government a kick’, and not only the Government but the 
political class as a whole. Their vote was guided by anger 
about elitist politicians, disconnected from their 
representative, responsible for industrial and welfare policies 
that put large parts of the working class in precarious 
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situations. The referendum showed that even Labour cannot 
rely on its working class support anymore. Both major 
parties, Conservatives and Labour, share the blame for the 
distrust in politics and the turn to populist parties with UKIP 
leading the way. 
Pauline Schnapper’s chapter on the crisis of British 
democracy provides more insights into the 
disenfranchisement of the people with their political leaders 
and the decline of political trust among the population. She 
also addresses the effects of disproportional representation 
through the first-past-the-post election system in the UK 
Parliament. The mis- or underrepresentation of large social 
groups has also fostered the division of the Union of England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Supporter of Scottish 
independence argue that Conservative-led Governments 
never had the democratic legitimacy to rule over Scotland. 
With the EU referendum, the crisis of the Union takes on a 
new dynamic. Even though you may argue in favour for 
Scotland being significantly more Europhile than the rest of 
the UK, or whether the Scottish working classes are more 
loyal to the Scottish National Party (SNP), Scottish residents 
still voted predominantly to remain and are now faced with 
the real chance of being dragged out of the EU by England 
(and Wales). Whilst Neil McGarvey and Fraser Stewart 
highlight the difference of referendums on Scottish 
independence and the EU membership and explain why the 
Leave campaign had little resonance in Scotland, the 
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contribution of Paul Cairney elaborates on the prospect for 
Scotland’s future in the Union. In his chapter, Arjan Schakel 
suggests that Scottish independence is unlikely and a 
stronger institutionalisation of shared rule would bind the 
devolved nations into a more stable settlement, instead of 
them drifting further apart. 
The referendum also raised a set of serious issues in Northern 
Ireland. The probability of an independent Northern Ireland – 
or even a reintegration into the Republic of Ireland – is not the 
same as for Scotland. Serious challenges will emerge for the 
still fragile peace process and the relations between the UK 
and the Southern and Northern parts of the Irish isle. These 
are thoroughly discussed in Paul Carmichael’s chapter. 
In addition to serious issues of devolution and political 
misrepresentation, it is important to understand that 
divisions are entrenched in the culture of British politics. The 
underlying dynamic of Westminster democracy is 
competition (Sturm 2015, 65) promoting a ‘winner takes it all’ 
mentality that lacks in ambition to compromise and an 
adversarial political culture that is rather country-dividing 
than country-uniting (King 2001). In this sense, the 
democratic understanding in British politics is a limited one, 
based on a top-down view in which governments are decisive 
not responsive. As Marsh et al. 2003 (312) put it: ‘the British 
political tradition emphasizes the idea that a responsible 
government is one which is willing and able to take strong, 
decisive, necessary action, even if that action is opposed by a 
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majority of the population.’ Unlike consensus-oriented 
democracies, the UK’s majoritarian system does not provide 
a protection for minorities. This principle also applies for the 
EU referendum after which a slight majority of 52 per cent get 
their will at the expense of 48 per cent of the voters – and 
others who could or have not voted. 
The pluralistic election system produces an adversarial style 
of debate unable to reconcile different interests and needs in 
society. All devolved assemblies are elected through a mix of 
majoritarian and proportional representation that allows 
smaller parties to establish themselves and requires the 
devolved executives to cooperate with other parliamentary 
groups. In the UK Parliament, however, the majority party 
has no incentive to find consensus with other political forces 
but is mostly concerned about serving a small share of the 
population who voted for them. I am not suggesting that this 
phenomenon is unknown to other countries but, unlike many 
modern democracies, British politics is still strongly 
characterised by hording power rather than sharing it (King 
2001). Hence, a system of government that, for a long time, 
provided strong leadership through clear parliamentary 
majorities has become the source of social and political 
incoherence and instability. 
Adversarial politics do not serve well for a reasonable 
exchange of arguments. The referendum campaign has been 
a particularly bad example of a nasty political discussion not 
guided by facts but by exaggerations and lies. One of the 
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most infamous untruths was printed in large letters on a red 
campaign bus, claiming that the UK would ‘send the EU £350 
million a week’ that could be used for the National Health 
Service. Shortly after the referendum leading Leave 
campaigners distanced themselves from this claim, along 
with promises to reduce immigration significantly. The 
mutual accusations of politicians in both camps has caused 
further damage to the levels of political trust. When the 
people realise that Brexit is not some miraculous cure to all 
their problems, and the promises made will not substantialise 
as expected, their disillusion will manifest or grow further. 
It is striking that neither Government nor the Leave side had 
any plan for the case of Brexit. What good is sovereignty 
when nobody wants to take responsibility? Cameron, the 
long-term facilitator of the referendum, resigned, Farage 
‘wanted his life back’, and it is doubtable whether Boris 
Johnson ever really wanted to leave the EU. Although the 
Conservative party managed to find a new Prime Minister 
shortly after Cameron stepped down, the game Boris 
Johnson and Michael Gove played became obvious when the 
latter withdrew his support for Johnson’s leadership 
ambitions and stood himself for elections. As Nick Cohen 
(2016) put it, ‘there are liars and then there’s Boris Johnson 
and Michael Gove’; suggesting that both do politics the same 
way, namely they produce headlines in their former careers 
as journalists: getting public attention through blunt 
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statements without caring about the consequences for the 
people they are meant to represent. 
Owen Jones (2014) offers a comprehensive account of elitism 
in British politics. Cameron and Johnson both went to Eton 
College, a cradle for future Prime Ministers and the UK’s elite. 
In its privileged, competitive environment, students learn to 
treat life as a game serving their individualist interests. This 
may explain why Cameron took a gamble with such a high 
stake when he gave the British a referendum on EU 
membership. Johnson, a man who has not shied away from 
producing false news as a journalist and from insulting 
politicians from other states, did become Prime Minister but 
Johnson is now representing Britain as the Foreign Secretary. 
At the same time, the internal fight in the Labour party 
between its socialist wing, behind Jeremy Corbyn, and its 
right-wing is ongoing and fierce. In a coup attempt shortly 
after the referendum, two-thirds of Corbyn’s shadow cabinet 
stepped down and three-quarters of Labour MPs refused him 
their confidence. Instead of holding Government into 
account and providing orientation in uncertain times, Labour 
is occupied by its own internal divide. No sign of re-building 
political trust can be expected from a party in such a desolate 
shape. 
There is presently no party in sight to seriously challenge the 
Conservatives for power, and it seems unlikely that this will 
change in the foreseeable future. Even the majoritarian, 
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bipolar logic of the Westminster democracy is thus 
temporarily suspended. Without a meaningful opposition no 
one can hold the Government to account for its actions. It is 
unlikely that the Government will introduce a new system of 
proportional representation that undermine its claim to 
power. Theresa May (7 July 2016) is aware that ‘If you’re from 
an ordinary working class family, life is much harder than 
many people in Westminster realise.’ Time will show what 
policies she will initiate to overcome the cleavage between 
rulers and the ruled, and if she will act in the interest of a 
minority or a majority of the UK. The Westminster system 
does not, however, promote consensus finding and an 
adversarial political culture does not change overnight. 
The inability of UK politicians to make compromises have 
been an ongoing problem in British relations with the EU, 
particularly under Conservative Governments. This has 
undermined the country’s role in Europe and has eventually 
contributed to the external division. It will remain to be seen 
how Theresa May and her cabinet will manage to negotiate a 
withdrawal agreement beneficial for the British economy, 
whilst at the same time pleasing the Eurosceptic forces in her 
party and in the country. Whereas she modestly supported 
Remain and may take a pragmatic approach in the 
discussions to come, Boris Johnson, Foreign Secretary, and 
David Davies, Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, both supported Leave and may be not as cooperative. 
Sandra Schwindenhammer’s contribution to this book 
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presents an insightful outlook on the procedures and 
challenges following a British notification on withdrawal from 
the EU under Article 50 TEU. 
 
Conclusion 
Large parts of the British population and its leaders have 
never been fully committed to pooling sovereignty and 
integrating with other Member States beyond economic 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the reasons that drove so many 
Brits to vote Leave in the referendum were less about a 
dissatisfaction with the EU but the expression of socio-
economic frustration, scapegoating immigrants and ethnic 
minorities, deep political distrust and anger towards a 
political elite that does not represent a high share of society. 
The referendum has made these divisions more obvious and 
triggered a public debate, which will most likely not disappear 
after the UK has left the EU. On the contrary, austerity 
measures have already widened the gap between the 
deprived and the affluent, and immediately after referendum 
markets responded negatively – the Pound Sterling lost in 
value and stock prices fell. It is not clear yet how Brexit will 
impact on trade relations, foreign investments and 
manufacturers, the UK service industry, research funds for 
universities and industry, and London’s global financial 
centre, but it is likely that Britain will undergo a ‘self-inflicted 
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recession’, or ‘DIY recession’ in Osborne’s words. More 
expensive imports will cause higher inflation and continuing 
decline of real incomes. And what about the EU immigrants 
that have made a net contribution of £25billion (Dustmann 
and Frattini 2013) to public finances between 2001 and 2011 
and helped to keep many public services going, including the 
NHS? Their loss would mean further economic decline and 
challenge the UK’s welfare systems, and thereby increase 
social inequalities and tensions. 
When, how and at what costs the break of both Unions will 
come remains to be seen. We now know that the UK 
Government wants to trigger Article 50 in spring 2017 
initiating a two-year negotiation phase after which the UK 
will cease being a member of the EU. At the moment, it looks 
like a ‘hard Brexit’ that favour control of immigration over 
access to the Single Market – prospects have further 
devaluated the Pound. Theresa May is also planning to 
introduce a Great Repeal Bill to remove the 1972 European 
Communities Act which will ‘restore’ the UK’s sovereignty 
and ‘free it to pass its own laws’, both announcement that 
would also not be reconcilable with many obligations of the 
Single Market. Whilst the external division seems 
unstoppable, containing the internal division requires 
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On 23 June 2016, a referendum on whether the UK should 
stay in the European Union was organised in Britain, 
following on a pledge made by David Cameron in January 
2013, and led to a negative vote, leading to the prospect of 
Britain leaving the EU. There was no need for such a vote, as 
referendums do not belong to the British constitutional 
tradition. The political system of Westminster is based on the 
principle of representative, not direct democracy, whereby 
the people delegate their sovereign rights to elected 
representatives in Parliament. This is why, legally, 
referendums cannot be binding but only indicative. 
Yet, there have been a growing number of referendums 
organised since; in 1975 the first referendum on membership 
of the European Economic Community (ECC) was held. More 
public votes followed after 1997 in Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland, the North-East of England and a national referendum 
on the reform of the electoral system in 2011. Most national 
referendums are initiated for domestic political reasons, in 




When a party or a government is divided on an important 
issue, it can be in danger of breaking up. The smaller the 
majority and the more important the issue, the greater the 
threat of lasting cleavages. In such a situation a party may 
embrace the referendum as a mediating device. The minority 
which is voted down can be reassured that the decision is in a 
way only temporary. The voters will have the last word. 
The following shows that this referendum was no exception. 
 
The Pledge 
David Cameron’s pledge to organise a referendum on EU 
membership was the result of strong pressures from about a 
third of the Eurosceptic backbenchers of his own party who 
blame EU institutions for being costly, undemocratic, 
bureaucratic and an obstacle to Britain enjoying the full 
benefits of globalisation. Originally, in the 2010 general 
election manifesto, the Conservative party leadership had 
promised to introduce a bill in Parliament imposing a 
referendum lock on any future European treaty which would 
require further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels. Cameron 
and William Hague, then Foreign Secretary, however, did not 
contemplate an in/out referendum. In October 2011, they 
imposed a three-line whip against a parliamentary motion 
demanding such a ballot. Eventually, in 2015, Cameron 
changed his mind as pressure from Conservative MPs and 
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part of the popular press – the Daily Express in particular, 
launched a successful petition among the public – grew. 
Moreover, in the light of the rising success of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), Conservatives were deeply 
worried about losing an increasing number of voters and 
activists to them. UKIP’s raison d’être was to campaign to 
leave the EU and they were attracting an increasing number 
of votes, especially in local and European elections.  
In his Bloomberg speech of 23 January 2013, Cameron set out 
what were, according to him, the three challenges faced by 
the EU: solving the Eurozone crisis, increasing economic 
competitiveness and improving democracy. He argued for 
more flexibility, less regulation, a stronger role for national 
parliaments and the repatriation of some powers to the 
national level. He promised a renegotiation of the terms of 
British EU membership, which would be followed by a 
referendum in Britain by the end of 2017. 
Having unexpectedly won the 2015 general election, 
Cameron had to live up to his pledge. The negotiations in 
Brussels took place in autumn and winter culminating in the 
February Brussels European Council. The outcome did not 
meet with what Cameron had originally promised and fell far 
short of the demands of the radical Eurosceptics. Cameron 
achieved an opt-out from the ‘Ever Closer Union’ clause in the 
European treaties, safeguards about the rights of non-
Eurozone countries, an agreement on completing the Single 
Market and, more importantly from his domestic political 
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point of view, an agreement on a possible ‘emergency brake’ 
that would stop new immigrants from getting in-work 
benefits for four years after their arrival in the UK. This was a 
far cry from a radical reform of the functioning of the EU and 
Britain’s position in it. Reactions to the result of the 
negotiations were therefore mostly negative in the tabloid 
press and among Eurosceptics. Cameron faced a tougher 
campaign to remain in the EU than he had anticipated. 
 
The Campaign 
Facing opposition, including within his own Cabinet, 
Cameron felt compelled to lift the principle of collective 
responsibility, a central feature of the British constitution, by 
which ministers are not allowed to criticise or oppose a policy 
adopted in Cabinet. Six Cabinet members plus Boris Johnson, 
the former Mayor of London, were therefore at the forefront 
of the campaign to leave the EU. They joined what became 
the official Leave campaign: Vote Leave. UKIP dominated 
another, unofficial but well-funded grassroots campaign: 
Leave.EU. Whereas the former concentrated on the global 
trade opportunities of a potential Brexit, the latter’s main 
message was to limit immigration from EU member states 
and to reclaim control of British borders. Both messages 
proved to be a successful combination on 23 June. 
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The Remain campaign was dominated, in the media at least, 
by David Cameron who, having defined himself originally as 
a Eurosceptic, suddenly turned into a supporter of European 
integration. He stressed the uncertainty and economic 
damage that leaving the EU would entail, calling it repeatedly 
‘a leap in the dark’. Other mainstream parties, Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party and the 
Greens, supported staying but their campaign, especially that 
of Labour, came late and was weak. The Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn, a traditional left-winger, had been a 
Eurosceptic for decades arguing that the EU was a neoliberal 
club. His call for Remain was undermined by criticism of the 
EU and thus he failed to reach large parts of Labour 
supporters. Shortly before the vote, half of Labour voters did 
not know which side their party was on. 
It was difficult to gauge public opinion during the campaign. 
The polls showed consistently that the result would be very 
close, with a high number of undecided voters (10 to 15 per 
cent according to several surveys). Nonetheless, most of 
them predicted a slight majority in favour of Remain, 
including the last YouGov survey published at 10 pm on 
election night, which saw 52 per cent in favour of Remain. The 
polls also pointed toward the division between the young and 
the old, the more and the less educated, and between cities 
and rural areas home to the ‘left-behind’ (Ford and Goodwin 
2014). The referendum confirmed these divides with major 
cities, especially London, voting to stay while rural areas in 
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the South and small industrial towns in the North voted to 
leave. 
 
The State of British Democracy 
The result of 23 June cannot only be blamed on the way the 
campaign was run. When Cameron promised a referendum, 
he did not take into account the state of British democracy. 
Five long-term factors can be identified that lead to the Leave 
vote. 
First, Euroscepticism is now embedded in British political 
culture. Fifty years of debate about Europe have led to an 
entrenched wariness about European institutions, fuelled by 
decades of negative media coverage and a negative 
discourse by large parts of the political elite. As I showed 
elsewhere (Schnapper 2015), it had become very difficult to 
articulate a positive discourse about Europe, especially since 
the end of the New Labour years (1997-2010). Cameron may 
have suffered from a kind of hubris when he thought he could 
reverse this trend within a few weeks of campaigning, after 
having himself criticised the EU for years as Conservative 
leader and then Prime Minister. 
Second, like many other Western democracies, the UK 
suffers from a drop in the level of trust towards politicians, 
which was not the case when the first referendum on the EEC 
took place in 1975. This has been well-documented by 
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authors like Pippa Norris (2011) and Colin Hay (2007). 
Although that is a widespread phenomenon across 
industrialised countries, it has been compounded in the UK 
by the Iraq war which exposed overblown statements, if not 
lies, about the reality of the Saddam Hussein regime and the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction. It was also 
increased by the 2009 MPs expenses scandal which tarnished 
the image of politicians in general. Today, only about 30 per 
cent of the British population trust political leaders, which 
clearly reduces the influence on voters’ decisions. Even 
though all mainstream party leaders supported Remain, 
voters did not follow their lead. 
Third, election turnout proved to be a key issue in the result. 
We know that long-term turnout has been on a downward 
trend since the 1970s in the UK. While it was consistently 
above 70 per cent and sometimes reached 80 per cent until 
then, it went down to below 60 per cent in 2001 before going 
up slightly to 65 per cent in 2015. There is a big gap between 
the turnout among young people, which is below 40 per cent, 
and among older people who continue to vote massively. This 
was going to have a profound impact on the referendum, 
since opinion polls showed that young people were much 
more favourable to staying in the EU than people over 55. 
Although in the end turnout was quite high on average (72 per 




Fourth, the referendum exposed the flaws in the first-past-
the-post electoral system, which sees the candidate with the 
highest number of votes in a constituency win the seat, 
whatever percentage of votes they have achieved. This 
prevents small parties from getting a strong representation 
in parliament because they are unlikely to come first, even 
though the Labour/Conservative duopoly represents an ever 
smaller share of voters. In the 2015 general election, the 
Conservatives and Labour gained only 67.3 per cent of the 
votes but still hold 86.62 per cent of the seats in Parliament. 
For the 12 million UKIP voters, which are only represented by 
one seat in Parliament, the referendum was the opportunity 
to make their voice loudly heard. Whether the present 
electoral system for general elections is sustainable when so 
many UKIP, but also Green or Liberal Democrat voters are 
underrepresented and therefore feel disenfranchised, is open 
to question. Pressure for a reform of the electoral system 
might grow in the future, although a previous referendum on 
the Alternative Vote, a form of proportional representation, 
saw it rejected in 2011. 
Finally, the referendum took place against the backdrop of 
strains in the Union between England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Even after the 2014 Scottish referendum on 
independence pressure from Scottish nationalism remained 
high, as illustrated by the dramatic success of the SNP in the 
general election of 2015. The EU referendum increased these 
tensions by reinforcing the difference between Scotland, 
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which voted largely to stay in the EU, and England, where 
Leave won. Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish First Minister, has 
already complained about the unfairness of having Scotland 
taken out of Europe against its will and mentioned the 
possibility of organising another referendum on Scottish 
independence before the UK leaves the EU. This represents a 
real risk that the Union between Scotland and England might 
break up in the years to come, even if the result of such a 
ballot would not be a foregone conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
All these strains in the British political system explain why it 
was such a risky gamble for Cameron to organise this 
referendum. The immediate aftermath of the vote – 
Cameron’s resignation and the crisis in the Labour party – is 
likely to undermine the party system even more, even if on 
the Conservative side at least the crisis has been contained by 
the swift appointment of Teresa May as leader. Tensions 
were reinforced, or at least exposed, by the campaign which 
was fought along populist lines pitting ‘the people’ against 
‘elites’ and ‘experts’ and pandering to fears about 
immigration. In the end, emotions and sound bites about 




The short-term consequences of the Brexit vote are already 
clear: the Sterling lost 10 per cent of its value and GDP is 
expected to drop in the coming year. The Prime Minister 
announced on 2 October at the Conservative Party 
Conference that she would activate Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty by the end of March 2017, opening a two-year period 
at the end of which Britain will no longer be a member of the 
EU. Theresa May’s previous position as Home Secretary, and 
pressure from the public and radical Brexiteers suggest that 
curbing EU immigration will be central to her strategy, 
possibly to the detriment of the British economy if it means 
leaving the single market entirely. Only the terms of leaving, 
and possibly a transition period, will probably be agreed by 
2019. Negotiating future trade deals with EU Member States 
and its trading partners will take much longer. A prolonged 
period of uncertainty is the only certainty we have. 
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3. Loose but not Lost! Four Challenges for the 
EU in the Aftermath of the British Referendum 
Sandra Schwindenhammer 
 
Just a few months ago, I was strongly convinced that the 
Brexit is not a realistic scenario. However, reality has caught 
up with me and with the European Union. The victory of the 
British Leave campaign on 23 June 2016 is a historic moment 
not only for the UK, but also for the EU’s remaining 27 
Member States. The future impact of the British referendum 
will depend on the new relationship between the UK and the 
EU. In this chapter, I will focus on some procedural, 
substantial, strategic and normative challenges the Brexit 
poses to European governance. I argue that the EU has to 
face four key challenges in the short and medium term in the 
aftermath of the British referendum: 
1. Dealing with procedural uncertainty under Article 50 
2. Dealing with substantial uncertainty 
3. Preventing Britain becoming the first domino 




Challenge 1: Dealing with Procedural Uncertainty 
under Article 50 
According to Article 50.1 of the Treaty on the European Union 
‘any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union 
in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ (EU 
2012a, 43). One might arguably state that, at first sight, 
Article 50 is unambiguous and clear. The procedural 
requirements for withdrawal comprise three steps and the 
involvement of several European institutions (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Source: European Parliament 2016, 4. 
Although Article 50 sets down the procedural requirements 
for withdrawal, the process after the British referendum to 
the establishment of a new relationship between the UK and 
the EU will be prolonged and highly uncertain. Applying 
findings from the European Parliaments Briefing in February 
2016, I argue that the legal framework under Article 50 
involves several veto points that make the withdrawal 
procedure highly unpredictable and uncertain. Veto points 
emerge from political institutions whose members are able to 
block attempts at policy change. They can arise from 
structures that are exogenous to the executive-legislative 
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relationship, such as judicial review or federalism, or from 
specific features of individual political systems, e.g. 
bicameralism (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 26). Veto points 
vary widely across political systems. The more veto points 
exist, the more difficult it is to achieve a common policy 
outcome. 
In the first step, the withdrawal process has to be initiated by 
a notification from the Member State wishing to withdraw to 
the European Council (European Parliament 2016, 3). This is 
what everybody in Brussels is presently waiting for. The 
timing of this notification is, however, entirely in the hand of 
the UK. On 2nd October 2016, Prime Minister Theresa May 
confirmed that she will trigger Article 50 by ‘the first quarter 
of 2017’. This decision corresponds with earlier statements on 
the UK’s likely timetable and preparatory work for Brexit by 
David Davies who is in charge of negotiating Britain’s 
withdrawal from the EU: 
The negotiating strategy has to be properly designed, and 
there is some serious consultation to be done first. 
Constitutional propriety requires us to consult with the Scots, 
Welsh, and Northern Irish governments first, and common 
sense implies that we should consult with stakeholders […]. 
This whole process should be completed to allow triggering 
of Article 50 before or by the beginning of next year. 
Prior to formal notification, Article 50 allows informal 
discussions between the country wishing to withdraw and 
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other Member States or EU institutions. However, it is 
unlikely that this will happen. In late June 2016, the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, along with the French President 
François Hollande and Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, 
insisted that there will be no formal or informal talks about 
the British withdrawal until the UK has officially triggered 
Article 50. Thus, it will also take some time until the European 
Council will provide the guidelines for the negotiations 
between the EU and the UK with the aim of concluding an 
agreement setting out concrete withdrawal arrangements. 
These arrangements should cover the departing Member 
State’s future relationship with the EU (European Parliament 
2016, 3). 
The EU and the UK have a timeframe of two years to agree 
on these arrangements. After that, membership ends 
automatically, unless the European Council and the Member 
State concerned jointly decide to extend this period 
(European Parliament 2016, 4). The two-year time period has 
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, one might 
argue that a two-year period allows for a cooling off. On the 
other hand, the time span leads to uncertainty and potential 
blackmailing (Rieder 2013, 157). According to Friel (2004, 
426), the two-year rule might enable the larger Member 
States to control the process of withdrawal to their own 
benefit, perhaps even using the threat of withdrawal to force 
concessions from the other Member States, knowing that 
any putative withdrawal could itself be withdrawn before the 
46 
 
two-year time period has expired. I assume that the two-year 
time-frame will either be extended, or, since the UK knows 
that withdrawal will take effect in any case after two years, 
the negotiations will not be characterised by strong attempts 
to find consensus until summer 2019. 
Step two of the formal withdrawal process involves the 
European Commission making recommendations to the 
Council to open negotiations with the UK. Before concluding 
an agreement in step three, the Council will need to obtain 
the European Parliament’s consent (European Parliament 
2016, 4). It should be noted that, whilst the British members 
of the European Council and of the Council will not participate 
in the discussions or decisions concerning the UK’s 
withdrawal, no similar provision exists for Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) elected in the UK. Although 
British MEPs have to represent the collective interests of all 
European citizens, I assume that national loyalties will prevail 
in this case. 
The Council has to conclude the withdrawal agreement with 
a so-called ‘super qualified majority’ (without the 
participation of the UK). According to Article 238.3(b) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the super 
qualified majority rule is only applied in the few cases when 
the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission 
or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (EU 2012b, 153-154). The super 
qualified majority is defined as at least 72 per cent of the 
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members of the Council, comprising at least 65 per cent of 
the population of the Member States (without the 
withdrawing state) (European Parliament 2016, 4). The future 
will show in how far the super qualified majority rule will 
impact the withdrawal process. Unlike the accession of new 
Member States, the withdrawal of a Member State does not 
require national ratification by the remaining members 
(European Parliament 2016, 4). However, any treaty change 
or international agreement, such as a free trade agreement, 
that might become necessary with Brexit, will need to be 
ratified by the remaining 27 Member States. Whether this will 
happen, I am not sure. All in all, there are too many veto 
points to allow for a reliable forecast of the procedure under 
Article 50. 
 
Challenge 2: Dealing with Substantial Uncertainty 
Article 50 does not establish any substantial conditions for a 
Member State to be able to exercise its right to withdrawal. 
There is a huge lack of clarity over what will replace British EU 
membership, especially with regard to the UK’s future Single 
Market access. To what extent will free trade and labour 
mobility between the UK and the EU continue? Will London 
still be Europe’s leading finance centre? These are only two of 
the numerous questions concerning European economies. 
Economists have done some research on future-scenarios 
and the potential impact of Brexit on the UK-EU economic 
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relationship (see i.e. Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 5 et seq.; 
Global Counsel 2015, 6). 
The authors differentiate several models. Under a scenario 
that resembles the EU-Norway relationship (Norwegian-style 
model), the UK joins the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
maintains full access to the Single Market, but must adopt EU 
standards and regulations. Although EEA members belong to 
the Single Market, they are not part of deeper European 
integration. For example, as an EEA member Norway does 
not belong to the EU’s customs union. This means Norwegian 
exports must satisfy ‘rules of origin’ requirements to enter the 
EU duty-free (Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 5). The Norwegian-
style model would not give the UK the political flexibility to 
justify Brexit. The UK would have to continue to pay billions 
in contributions to the EU without having a say in shaping the 
rules of the Single Market. 
The Turkish-style customs union model avoids internal tariff 
barriers, with the UK adopting many EU product market 
regulations (Global Counsel 2016, 6). However, sector 
coverage would be incomplete and the UK would be required 
to implement EU external tariffs without guaranteed access 
to third markets. By contrast, the much looser most-favoured 
nation model implies that the UK’s trade with the EU would 
only be governed by rules of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) (Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 7). The most-favoured 
nation model will likely be applied when the UK and the EU 
cannot agree upon any specific economic arrangement. The 
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model would give flexibility, but is likely to jeopardise trade 
and investment (Global Counsel 2016, 6). The UK’s exports to 
the EU and other WTO members would be subject to the 
importing countries’ most-favoured nation tariffs. This would 
raise the cost of exporting to the EU for UK firms (Ottaviano 
et al. 2014). 
The most likely models are either the Swiss-style model of 
bilateral accords governing access to specific sectors of the 
Single Market or the comprehensive FTA-based model (Free 
Trade Agreement) (Global Counsel 2016, 4). Under the Swiss-
style model, the UK and the EU would agree a set of bilateral 
accords which regulate UK access to the Single Market in 
specific sectors. However, the EU would be under no 
obligation to serve the UK everything on the menu, which 
means that the Swiss model would not provide the same 
guarantee of market access that EU or EEA membership offer 
(Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 6). 
Under the FTA-based model, the UK would be free to agree 
FTAs independently and the UK’s relationship with the EU is 
itself governed by an FTA. Both models – the Swiss-style 
model of bilateral accords and a comprehensive FTA-based 
model – would require prolonged negotiation followed by 
compromises and may still impose costs. According to 
Ottaviano et al. (2014, 3), trade costs after the UK leaving the 
EU will likely increase because of (i) higher tariff barriers 
between the UK and the EU, (ii) higher non-tariff barriers to 
trade (arising from different regulations, border controls, 
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etc.) between the UK and the EU, and (iii) non-participation 
of the UK in future steps that the EU takes towards deeper 
integration reducing non-tariff barriers. The last aspect is 
particularly important when we think of the ongoing TTIP 
negotiations and the question what role the UK still has to 
play in this process.  
In early October 2016, Theresa May emphasised that the UK’s 
negotiations with the EU will be based on ‘the freedom to 
make our own decisions on a whole host of different matters, 
from how we label our food to the way in which we choose to 
control immigration’. In this regard she rejected the 
Norwegian-style model and the Swiss-style model: ‘It is not, 
therefore, a negotiation to establish a relationship anything 
like the one we have had for the last 40 years or more. So it is 
not going to be a Norway model. It’s not going to be a 
Switzerland model. It is going to be an agreement between 
an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the 
European Union’. The future will show to what extent 
Theresa May’s insistence on the principles of sovereignty and 
independence will hinder, and not enhance, a viable long-
term solution that guarantees the free movement of goods 
and services between the UK and the EU. I assume that the 
UK’s future Single Market access will be a long, uncertain and 
maybe costly journey, taking not two years, but ten years or 
more. In this regard, I am not as optimistic as David Davis 




The ideal outcome, (and in my view the most likely, after a lot 
of wrangling) is continued tariff-free access. Once the 
European nations realise that we are not going to budge on 
control of our borders, they will want to talk, in their own 
interest. There may be some complexities about rules of 
origin and narrowly-based regulatory compliance for exports 
into the EU, but that is all manageable. 
 
Challenge 3: Preventing Britain Becoming the First 
Domino 
The third challenge refers to the potential domino effect 
threatening the European unity. Immediately after the British 
referendum, right-wing political leaders, such as Dutch 
politician Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, the head of 
France’s Front National, called for their own votes on EU 
membership. The rise of right-wing populism fuels 
Eurosceptic positions. Negative positions towards 
immigrants and the bureaucratic EU elites, who, allegedly, do 
not listen to the concerns of ordinary people, can be found 
among all right-wing parties’ programmes in Europe 
(Rooduijn 2015). Right-wing political leaders take advantage 
of the rising resentment over the fallout from globalisation 
which has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. 
They present themselves as the voice of Eurosceptic citizens 
and argue that the European political elite is arrogant, selfish, 
incompetent and corrupt (Rooduijn 2015, 4 et seq.). 
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Indeed, Euroscepticism provides a strong rational for 
European citizens to vote for right-wing parties (Werts et al. 
2012). Since many mainstream parties today only offer 
positive or appeasing messages towards European 
integration, citizens who are Eurosceptic, often have little 
other option than to vote for parties on the fringes of the 
political spectrum (Rooduijn 2015, 4). Is there currently a 
realistic threat of a ‘Frexit’ or a ‘Nexit’ posed by right-wing 
parties in Europe? I do not think that a majority of the 
national citizens in France and the Netherlands would also 
decide to leave the EU. It seems more likely that the EU will 
take a tough stance in the negotiations with the UK to set an 
example and prevent other countries to take the same path. 
Nevertheless, in order to stop right-wing populist parties 
from rising further, political discussions within and about 
Europe need to give a stronger voice to citizens that feel left 
behind. 
 
Challenge 4: Dealing with the Enduring Legitimacy 
Crisis and New Nationalisms 
From a more optimistic point of view, one might argue that 
the UK leaving the EU serves as a wakeup call. Brexit could be 
the salutary shock needed for change. Right after the British 
referendum, Angela Merkel said that it is now a ‘turning point 
for Europe’ and Francois Hollande suggested ‘to move 
forward; Europe cannot act as before’. The EU suffers a lack 
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in input and output legitimacy. Less and less citizens 
participate in European elections, and many doubt that the 
European Commission’s agenda benefits them. The 
institutional reforms that gradually endowed the European 
Parliament with more power have not managed to increase 
the EU’s political authority. The shift from the ‘permissive 
consensus’ to the ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009) jeopardises the EU’s legitimacy, hampers 
European integration and fuels Euroscepticism. 
Efforts of further European integration had been rejected 
before in national referendums. In 2008, the Irish voted 
against the Treaty of Lisbon, and in 1992, the Danish rejected 
the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In both 
cases, citizens were asked to vote again after the provision of 
national concessions and, finally, voted in favour of the EU 
treaties. The two referendums serve as illustrative examples 
of earlier setbacks in the European integration process. They 
also reveal an elite-public gap and indicate the growing 
impact of European citizens and public opinion. The rise of 
Euroscepticism among European citizens shows that 
previous efforts to solve the democratic deficit have had 
limited success. Most mainstream parties are more Euro-
supportive than voters and still resist politicising the 
European integration issue (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 21). 
Eurosceptic parties on the populist right and radical left seem 
to be closer to the pulse of public opinion than mainstream 
parties. On the far left, opposition to European integration 
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expresses antipathy to capitalism; on the populist right, it 
expresses defense of national communities (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 21). Nationalism is rising along with negative 
public attitudes towards the EU, which put Member State 
politics under pressure (Schmidt 2015, 56). However, 
simplistic demands of regaining sovereignty and national 
control over policies ignore the fact that state capacities are 
systematically limited in times of globalisation. The golden 
age of statehood, ideally characterised by a complete overlap 
of its four basic dimensions – resources, law, legitimacy and 
welfare (Leibfried and Zürn 2005) – seems to be history. With 
its decline since the late 1970s, various functions traditionally 
ascribed to the nation state have dispersed into the 
international realm (internationalisation) and to new actors 
(privatisation) (Flohr et al. 2010, 4). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the procedural, substantial, 
strategic and normative challenges that Brexit poses in the 
short and medium term to European governance. From a 
procedural perspective (challenge 1), multiple veto points do 
not allow for a reliable forecast of the procedure under Article 
50. Moreover, the effectiveness of veto points highly depends 
on the extent to which a veto is complete, permanent and 
non-appealable (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 26). In the 
substantial dimension (challenge 2), the UK’s future Single 
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Market access will be a long and a costly journey. The UK’s 
‘continued tariff-free access’ (Davis 2016) to the Single 
Market after Brexit is still a long way off. We do not know how 
long it will take to come to an agreement and whether the 
Swiss-style model or the comprehensive FTA-based model will 
prevail. From a strategic perspective (challenge 3), the EU will 
likely take a tough stance in the negotiations with the UK to 
prevent other countries (e.g. France or the Netherlands) 
taking the same path. The most pressing and important 
challenge for the EU is to solve its enduring legitimacy crisis 
(challenge 4). 
In order to (re-)gain the support of the European public, the 
EU will have to protect, improve or create policies that 
contribute to more inclusiveness, transparency, fairness and 
accountability (input legitimacy) and to develop governance 
arrangements in a way that allow for more efficient and 
effective policy outcomes (output legitimacy) (Scharpf 1999). 
All in all, I agree with Vivian Schmidt (2015, 56) that there is 
still a window to solve the European legitimacy crisis and to 
respond to the rise of the new nationalisms – but it may not 
be open for long. As the EU legitimacy crisis continues and 
disillusionment grows, right-wing populism will become 
increasingly difficult to reverse. Subsequently, it will become 
harder to resolve the crisis with innovative ideas as 
polarisation will increase. Thus, to put it in a nutshell, the EU 
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4. European, not British? Scottish Nationalism 
and the EU Referendum 
Neil McGarvey and Fraser Stewart 
 
The EU Referendum campaign, result and aftermath have 
ensured that Scotland’s constitutional status both within the 
United Kingdom and the European Union remains in sharp 
focus. Eyes are now firmly fixed on the Scottish government, 
as they initiate plans to hold a second vote on Scottish 
independence. Whether or not the people of Scotland are 
ready for another referendum, having already voted on 
independence in 2014 and on membership of the European 
Union earlier this year, remains to be seen. 
Of course, there is a palpable desire among vastly pro-Europe 
nationalist voters and politicians for a second campaign, with 
data suggesting most favour another ballot within the next 
24 months (Stewart 2016, forthcoming). That would mean 
three major referenda in Scotland in six years. Already we 
have endured two major constitutional votes since 2014, with 
two major general elections in between. But it is important to 
note that the Scottish and European referendums were two 





Two Very Different Campaigns 
Naturally, some similarities between the Scottish 
independence and Brexit campaigns were evident; both 
invoked the image of an institutional oppressor to some 
degree, for example, as a means to creating something of an 
anti-establishment image. Both invoked a version of 
nationalism. But even these shallow similarities are vastly 
different on closer inspection. Beyond surface level, the two 
‘change’ campaigns – 2014 ‘Yes’ and 2016 ‘Leave’ – in fact 
shared very little in common. Stark contrasts were evident in 
everything from content to strategy to engagement. 
First, Scotland’s Yes campaign was one underpinned by an 
unerring optimism. From the name itself to campaign 
slogans and propaganda, the Yes movement was almost 
entirely positive by design. It was an initiative governed by 
the notion that people want to vote for something, rather 
than against it – a lesson learned perhaps from previous 
campaigns won by the then first Minister and figurehead of 
the Yes campaign, Alex Salmond, in 2007 and 2011 
respectively (see Mitchell et al. 2013). Central messages 
focussed not on the oppression of Westminster, but rather on 
decidedly egalitarian and progressive messages, such as 
peace, fairer wages, heightened prosperity within the 
international community and a closer relationship with 
government. Vote Leave, on the other hand, was very much 
a negative project, hinged predominantly on the principle of 
invoking social anxieties. Voting to leave the EU and ‘Take 
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Back Control’ was sold as the only way to placate these 
concerns: control of borders and citizenship were especially 
prominent sentiments. 
Participation in each campaign was equally divergent. 
Between 2012 and 2014, Yes Scotland successfully mobilised 
grassroots participation to quite an emphatic degree, with 
over 250 local Yes groups formed throughout the campaign 
(not including other initiatives, such as Radical Independence 
and Labour for Indy). Tens of thousands of activists quite 
famously took to the streets, canvassed, delivered leaflets 
and debated the merits of Yes across the country. Social 
media was also employed as a key and thriving battleground. 
Indeed, the ‘political awakening’ created by the Scottish 
referendum is well-renowned (Geohegan 2014; Blain et al. 
2016). The EU referendum, on the other hand, remained a 
largely elitist debate. Grassroots mobilisation was virtually 
non-existent in comparison. Instead both the Leave and 
Remain campaigns were represented almost exclusively by a 
handful of elected Westminster MPs, and fought very much 
across newspaper and television platforms. 
 
Two Very Different Nationalisms 
Each of these factors ties in with the matter of nationalism. 
Much is often said, quite lazily, about the badness of 
nationalism; its insularity and its regressive tendencies and 
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often discriminatory sentiments (see Brown 1999 for a 
review). But these two campaigns show just how immensely 
diverse the topic of nationalism can be. 
Derived from its message of positivity, the Yes campaign 
promoted a nationalism which was far less about the cultural 
superiority traditionally associated with nationalist 
movements, and far more to do with political empowerment. 
It forged a tenet of what has since come to be known as ‘civic’ 
nationalism – a diverse and forward-thinking ideology, 
premised on the vision of Scotland as an open and equal 
society. 
Vote Leave, however, very much presented the populist and 
xenophobic vulgarities of old. Immigration, refugees and 
terrorism would all become key spectres in the race to win 
votes. Underlying scepticism towards immigrants in the UK 
was fuelled into something far more socially divisive, while 
the image of pure and imperial ‘Great Britishness’ was 
invoked as a collective identity. 
Such ‘Great British’ values are little recognisable in Scotland. 
In recent years, British identity has shifted from the New 
Labour vision – one with ‘global connections and European 
roots’ (Parekh 2000, 260) – back to the more ‘cartoonish’ 
superiority complex of the Conservatives (Kidd 2008, 5). It is 
a version of British identity articulated by and commonly 
associated with the likes of Enoch Powell and Margaret 
Thatcher, and hinges on four main criteria: the absolute 
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sovereignty of the UK parliament; Britain as an individualist 
society; pre-political unity of the British people under shared 
values; and the centrality of British interests in all matters, 
foreign and domestic. It is a British identity sceptical of 
European involvement, opposed to a large welfare state and 
staunchly against the principles of Home Rule in Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales. 
Scotland has not given backing to such discourse in decades, 
decisively rejecting time and again the politics of 
Thatcherism and Britishness so synonymously associated 
with traditional Conservative philosophy (Hassan 2014, 130). 
The EU debate of 2016 thus never did look like the one in 
Scotland two years prior – largely because it felt like the 
Scottish people had no part in it. Viewed from north of the 
border, the EU debate was one taking place elsewhere; an 
alien debate reminiscent of the imperial British nation pre-
Common Market. Conservative versus Conservative debates 
were intensely Anglo-centric, and lacking in the egalitarian 
principles so often attributed to the Scottish electorate 
(Cairney and McGarvey 2013; Hassan 2014). Even the 
immediate Brexit fallout – the impact on the City (of London), 
the collapse of sterling, the resignation of David Cameron 
and mass exodus of Labour’s shadow cabinet – felt like 
foreign issues, and existed in immense disparity to the 
seemingly stable nature of politics in Edinburgh. 
By the time votes were counted, the sense of political 
divergence was obvious. If Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s 
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version of Britishness is inherently Eurosceptic, Scottish 
sentiments were far from harmonious. This divergence was 
reflected perhaps most unambiguously in the final result, 
which saw the UK as a whole vote to leave the EU (52 per cent 
to 48 per cent), with Scotland voting quite conclusively to 
remain (62 per cent to 38 per cent). Every single one of 
Scotland’s 32 local council areas, including its island councils, 
voted to stay part of the European Union. The Anglo-
centricity of the debate and indeed the collective British 
identity had not resonated with voters in Scotland as it had 
elsewhere in the UK. Quite the contrary in fact: this outcome 
would present a brief but sharp spike in support for 
independence, and afford Nicola Sturgeon precisely the 
‘material change’ she had been seeking to demand a new 
Scottish referendum. 
 
European, not British? Scottish Nationalism and the 
EU 
Considerable uncertainty has hence been thrown up in 
Scotland by the EU referendum result. Despite Scottish 
political leaders surviving the post-Brexit cull, nothing else is 
particularly secure in either European or domestic affairs. The 
2016 Scotland Act, with its maelstrom of shared 
responsibilities between Holyrood and Westminster, looks 
like a recipe for volatility. Combined with the residual and 
unerring support for independence amongst a substantial 
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portion of the population, the constitutional question 
remains far from settled; if anything, it looms more 
prominently now than ever before. Without question, the two 
referenda have done substantially more to de-stabilise, 
rather than solidify, Scotland’s place within the United 
Kingdom. 
Further uncertainty is to be found in the actual process of 
leaving. The UK government has indicated it will not invoke 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty until Spring 2017, meaning 
that the UK is likely to remain an EU member state until 2019. 
Nobody quite knows exactly what the triggering of Article 50 
will mean in practice. Beyond affirming that the will of the 
electorate will be implemented with a series of meaningless 
soundbites (‘Brexit means Brexit’), information regarding 
how to proceed is scarce. Needless to say, whenever Article 
50 is triggered in 2017, it will have implications across a huge 
range of policy areas in the UK, as outlined by a recent House 
of Commons paper (2016). 
But the effects to UK policy areas are perhaps the least of the 
UK government’s worries, knowing now the very real threat 
posed by Brexit to the Union. At the 2016 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections, the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
insisted that a vote to leave Europe against Scotland’s will 
would potentially trigger a second independence 
referendum; the promise now-famously alluded to as a 
‘material change in circumstances’ in their manifesto. Some 
might assume, then, that the nationalist attachment to 
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Europe is merely an act of political opportunism to achieve 
the ultimate aim of independence – this would be a very 
narrow and selective interpretation to make. 
This European/Scottish nationalist affinity is more than a 
recent political invention. Since launching their 
‘Independence in Europe’ slogan at the party’s 1988 Annual 
Conference, the SNP have utilised attachment to and 
membership of the EU as a counter to the unionist charge of 
separatism. Given their desire for full Scottish autonomy, 
many have quite reasonably questioned the ideological 
consistency of being both pro-Europe and pro-
independence. It is not, however, an impossible position by 
any means. The SNP have long sought to cement a 
relationship between their brand of outward, civic 
nationalism and emphasise its cogency with the European 
project. Its written constitution, shared rule and 
intergovernmental politics are all attributes favoured within 
Scottish nationalism over the centralised single-party 
governance of Westminster. An independent Scotland would 
seek a formal constitution which was modern in its assertion 
of ideals, rather than adopting the UK’s instrumentalist 
approach. An independent Scotland would ultimately be a 
European one. 
Herein lie the ideological roots of the Yes movement and 
indeed much of the enduring support for Scottish 
independence – what Barton Swaim of the Washington Post 
described as ‘post-national nationalism’ (2016). At the very 
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heart, Scotland’s nationalism is not insular, and nor does it 
seek autonomy for autonomy’s sake; it is not culturally 
superior or nationally charged in any significant way, as was 
the conservative British nationalism of the EU referendum. 
Rather, it is an almost practical and decidedly political 
position that seeks both a closer relationship between people 
and power, and Scotland and the international community. 
 
Conclusion 
The path to independence remains fraught with obstacles. 
Gaining consent to host a second referendum from an 
especially hostile Conservative government will not be 
straightforward. Nor will winning one – opinions on both the 
Yes and No sides have hardened since 2014 (Khomami 2016). 
Despite a flurry of post-Brexit opinion polls in late June 
showing majorities for independence (Philip 2016), more 
recent polls still tend to show a small majority against. 
Indeed, the economic case for Scottish independence has 
suffered as a result of falling oil process since 2014, while the 
question of currency remains unanswered. 
But it is impossible to deny that Scotland’s relationship in the 
UK since 1999 has been that of an ever-looser Union. The 
2014 referendum vote may have affirmed that the people of 
Scotland were not quite ready for divorce, but this is no 
longer 2014. Two years later, the paradigm has very much 
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been altered. Remaining in the UK is no longer the status quo 
option. There is no middle-ground choice. One involves 
leaving the EU with the rest of the UK, the other leaving the 
UK whilst remaining on the EU. The UK of 2014 is gone. 
Moreover, this is no longer the age of New Labour’s British 
identity, with its Europhilia and internationalism in line with 
the Scottish nationalist ethos; this is a decidedly Conservative 
British identity – one that looks and feels regressively Anglo-
centric at the heart of it, and foreign to many in Scotland. The 
chasm between contemporary Scottish and British 
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5. The Future of Scotland in the UK: Does the 




The vote to remain in the UK, in the Scottish independence 
referendum in 2014, did not settle the matter. Nor did it harm 
the fortunes of the pro-independence party, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). Instead, its popularity has risen 
remarkably, and major constitutional change remains high 
on the agenda, particularly during the run up to a referendum 
on the UK’s exit from the EU. This continued fascination with 
the constitution overshadows the day-to-day business of 
Scottish politics. I highlight one aspect in particular: the 
tendency for limited public and parliamentary scrutiny of 
substantive policy issues when they are viewed through a 
constitutional rather than a substantive policy lens, 
producing an image of weak accountability. The aim of this 
chapter is to 
• Explain why the SNP’s popularity is remarkable. 
• Note that none of us have predicted it – or indeed much 
of the short history of devolution - too well, and use this 
point as a cautionary tale. 
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• Describe why independence is not inevitable, even 
though it often seems likely. 
• Shoehorn in some analysis of the links between our 
fascination with the constitution and the more humdrum 
world of actual policy.  
• Provide a brief update on the impact of the EU 
referendum, bearing in mind that I am just as hopeless as 
anyone else about predicting the future. 
 
The Remarkable Popularity of the SNP 
The SNP’s popularity is remarkable. Scottish Labour had 
dominated Westminster and local elections in Scotland for 
decades before the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999 
– it also won a plurality of European Parliament seats, but 
with far lower margins. Labour won most Scottish seats in 
every election from 1959-2010. In 1997, it won 46 per cent of 
the vote and 56 (78 per cent) of 72 Scottish Westminster seats 
(Cairney and McGarvey 2013, 45). The SNP won 22 per cent 
of the vote and 6 (8 per cent) seats. A similar pattern 
continued until 2010: Labour dominated Scottish 
Westminster seats even when the SNP began to win 
Holyrood elections. In the elections for the Scottish 
Parliament, its 44 per cent of the vote translated into 613 (53 
per cent) of 1155 seats in 1995, and it remained the largest 
party until 2007 (Cairney and McGarvey 2013, 51). 
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This dominance produced an expectation that Scottish 
Labour would become the largest party in the Scottish 
Parliament for the foreseeable future. In that context, the 
fortunes of Labour and the SNP changed remarkably quickly. 
In 1999 and 2003, the main limit to Labour dominance was 
the electoral system: it won the majority of constituency 
seats comfortably but few regional seats and it also won most 
constituency seats in 2007. By 2011, this position had 
reversed and, by 2016, the regional list was the only thing 
standing between Scottish Labour and electoral oblivion.  
In contrast, by 2011 the SNP achieved a majority of Scottish 
Parliament seats because the regional element of the mixed-
member proportional system (56 of 129 seats) was not large 
enough to offset SNP dominance of constituency seats. This 
is a remarkable outcome if we accept the well-shared story 
that Holyrood’s electoral system was ‘chosen by Labour to 
stop the SNP ever the getting the majority it needed to push 
hard on the independence agenda’ (Cairney 2011, 28). 
It is also remarkable that the SNP’s popularity did not dip 
after the 2014 referendum. You could be forgiven for thinking 
that a No vote in the referendum on Scottish independence 
would damage the SNP (Cairney 2015). If it is a single issue 
party, and most voters rejected its position on the issue, 
wouldn’t you expect it to suffer? Yet, here is what happened 
instead: its membership rocketed, from 25,000 to 75,000 in 
two weeks, then to 115,000 by 2016; it won 56 of 59 
Westminster seats in Scotland (2015) on the back of 50 per 
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cent of the vote; and it won a third Holyrood election in a row, 
only missing out narrowly on a second majority in a row, in a 
Mixed Member Proportional system. 
This is not so remarkable if you know that the SNP is not a 
single issue party. Instead, it is a highly professional 
organisation which has won elections on the back of valence 
politics as well as identity. The SNP did well in 2007 (Johns et 
al. 2009), and very well in 2011, because ‘most voters thought 
that the party would do a better job in office than its rivals’ 
(Johns et al. 2013). People vote for a party when they respect 
its leader, its vision for the future, and have a high 
expectation of its competence while in office – and the SNP 
has benefited from being a party that looks highly 
professional (although one’s belief in the competence of the 
SNP may be linked strongly to one’s national identify and 
support for independence). 
So, (a) it is worth noting that the SNP is doing well partly 
because 45 per cent of the vote will not win you a referendum, 
but it (plus a bit more) will do very nicely in a not-super-
proportional election system, but (b) there is far more to the 
SNP’s story than a translation of national identity into 
support for independence. 
You will always find someone who claims that they predicted 
these developments correctly, but that is because of the 
immense number and range of hyperbolic predictions – from 
the claim that devolution provided a ‘stepping stone’ to 
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independence (Dalyell 2009), to the claim that it would kill 
nationalism ‘stone dead’ – rather than the predictability of 
politics. So, for example, in retrospect we can say that 
devolution provided an important new platform for the SNP 
(Johns et al. 2010), but at the time we did not know that it 
would use this platform so effectively from the mid-2000s. 
Similarly, maybe some people in the future will look back to 
argue that Scottish independence was inevitable, but without 
being able to predict the detailed mechanisms of decisions 
and events. 
 
Scottish Independence is Not Inevitable (Even 
Though it Often Seems Likely) 
Before the Brexit vote, I tried to sell the idea that 10 years is 
the magic figure between Scottish referendums (2014 and 
2024): a short enough distance to keep pro-independence 
actors content, and long enough to hope that enough people 
have changed their minds. In the meantime, the SNP and 
Greens would produce some vague triggers, like a surge in 
opinion poll support. 
Now, if a second referendum is to happen, it is because of the 
constitutional crisis prompted by Brexit. Overall, most UK 
voters chose to leave the European Union, but most voters in 
Scotland chose to remain. The SNP and its allies will push for 
a second referendum on that basis, with reference to a 
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‘democratic outrage’. It possesses the votes to pass a bill to 
that effect in the Scottish Parliament, and needs some 
cooperation from a UK Government led by the party that just 
used a referendum to justify major constitutional change. It is 
difficult to see why the Conservative Government would 
oppose a referendum under those circumstances – rather 
than allow it to take place and argue for the Union – even 
though UK government ministers have rejected the idea so 
far. 
If a second referendum happens, it could happen before 
2020. I am hesitant to say when exactly, partly because there 
is so much uncertainty, which too many people try to fill with 
needless speculation. For example, Sturgeon confirmed that 
it could happen as early as 2017, but only because the BBC 
asked her what she would do if the UK Government behaved 
unreasonably.  In the same interview, Sturgeon also 
suggested that it may take a long time for the UK to invoke 
Article 50, which triggers a notional two-year negotiation 
period before the UK leaves the EU.  
Before we know if a second referendum is likely, and the likely 
date, we need clarity on two things: first, the extent to which 
the UK can, and is willing to, negotiate a deal with the EU 
which satisfies the SNP and Scottish voters – by becoming 
Brexit-lite or providing Scotland-specific provisions on key 
issues like the free movement of people; and second, the 
timing of Brexit, since a Scottish referendum would hopefully 
not take place until we know what we are voting for – which 
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might not happen until near the end of the notional two-year 
negotiations. Still, it is likely that the vote would be binary, as 
some version of: stay in the UK out of the EU, or leave the UK 
and stay in the EU. 
Dissatisfaction with devolution is not the same as support for 
independence. Recent events reinforce the sense that 
Scottish devolution will never seem like a ‘settlement’. 
Instead, until recently, we have had a routine process in 
which: (a) there is a proposed devolution settlement, (b) it 
sticks for a while, (c) there is a rise in support for 
independence or further devolution, and (d) there is another 
settlement.  
So far, this has happened in 1999, the first modern 
settlement, from the SNP’s first Holyrood win in 2007 
producing the Scotland Act 2011, and during the referendum 
itself producing the Scotland Act 2016. The difference this 
time is the sense – often generated by supporters and 
opponents of independence – that the 2016 Act is the final 
offer. If so, before Brexit, we had two key scenarios: first, this 
offer proves to be too unpopular to maintain support for 
devolution, there is a further referendum, and no-one can 
offer more devolution in exchange for a No vote. Second, the 
2016 Act finally helps address the idea of a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in which (a) most people in Scotland vote for one party 
in a UK general election – usually Labour, now SNP – but get 
another – often Conservative, and (b) this problem helps 
produce the sense that the UK Government is imposing 
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unpopular policies on Scotland. For the new act to work, you 
would need to generate the widespread sense, among the 
public, that a Scottish Government could choose to mitigate 
the effects of a UK Government, perhaps without raising 
taxes. 
Now, things are a bit more complicated, since devolution is 
no longer simply about Scotland’s position in the UK. 
Scenario two now has to be accompanied by the sense, 
however true, that the Scottish Government is able to 
negotiate a distinctive relationship with the EU while 
remaining in the UK. 
 
What Happens in the Meantime? The Humdrum 
World of Scrutiny and Policy-Making 
In the meantime, Scottish politics exhibits an unusual twist on 
the usual tale of Westminster politics. We have the familiar 
disconnection between two understandings of politics, in 
which (a) we use elections and some parliamentary scrutiny 
to praise or blame governments, but also (b) recognise the 
limits to central control, which undermine a meaningful sense 
of accountability. This confusion is complicated by 
devolution and ‘multi-level governance’ in which we are not 
always sure about which level of government is responsible 
for which policy – although Brexit will remove a level from 
many of those relationships! The 2016 Act, in which there are 
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many new shared responsibilities between the Scottish and 
UK Governments, adds complexity and confusion to the 
settlement. So, politicians tell very different stories about 
what the Scottish Government can do, who is in charge, and 
who should take the blame for policy outcomes. Moreover, 
the Scottish Parliament continues to struggle to know how 
best to try to hold the Scottish Government to account and it 
might soon struggle a bit more. 
Perhaps one possible exception is the new debate on 
educational attainment. First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
staked a large part of her reputation on reducing the gap in 
attainment between students in the most and least deprived 
areas of Scotland. Before the election, she promised to ‘close 
the attainment gap completely’. Although the SNP 
manifesto in 2016 presents more equivocal language, 
reflecting the sense that it does not know how much it can 
reduce the gap, it remains significant as an issue in which 
there are constitutional complications. The Scottish 
Government does not control fully the economic and social 
security ‘levers’ affecting levels of deprivation, but the SNP is 
not using them to qualify its aims. This example supplements 
several ongoing debates of high party political importance, in 
which there is not a constitutional element on, for example, 
the Scottish Government’s ‘named person’ policy and 
legislation on ‘offensive behaviour’ in relation to football. 
Maybe such cases suggest that, for at least the next few 
years, we will pretend that there is a Scottish devolution 
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settlement and that we are not just killing time until the next 
referendum. This, however, already seems like an out of date 
hope. The constitution is back at the top of our agenda, and I 
cannot remember the last time I read a story about domestic 
policy in Scotland. 
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6.   Reflections from Northern Ireland on the 




As the deluge subsides and the waters fall short, we 
see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone 
emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is 
one of the few institutions that have been unaltered in 
the cataclysm which has swept the world. 
Winston Churchill, 22 February 1922 
 
Written in the aftermath of the Great War, and the 
subsequent partition of Ireland as a prelude to the creation of 
the ‘Irish Free State’, Winston Churchill’s disparaging remarks 
have often been recalled in Northern Ireland, as the effects of 
later world events have been refracted through the prism of 
the Province’s politics. In this, the centenary year of the Battle 
of the Somme, although immeasurably less seismic in nature 
than that titanic struggle, the impact of the outcome of the 
United Kingdom’s recent referendum on European Union 
membership, continues to reverberate through the body 
politic of this Province, the UK as a whole, and indeed across 
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the rest of Europe. What will ‘Brexit’ mean for Northern 
Ireland? At this stage, with so much uncertainty, one can 
largely only speculate. However, while details remain elusive, 
it is clear that there are major implications and unintended 




In the first ever pan-UK referendum, that on continued British 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) or 
‘Common Market’ in June 1975, Northern Ireland voted by 52 
per cent to 48 per cent to accept the revised terms that had 
been negotiated by the Labour Government. Nationally, the 
vote was 67 per cent in favour of remaining – the only parts of 
the entire UK to vote against, were the Western Isles and 
Shetland Islands. The result in Northern Ireland that year was: 
Yes 259,251 52.1% 
No 237,911 47.9% 
Turnout 48.2% 
In comparison, the rest of the UK endorsed staying in the EEC 
by a far greater margin. 
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Yes 17,378,581 67.2% 
No 8,470,073 32.8% 
Turnout 64.5% 
Nonetheless, there was some surprise that Northern Ireland 
had supported remaining in the Common Market. The 
Province’s Unionist majority, fearful that the EEC might 
undermine the already contested constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland, had been expected to back the ‘No’ 
campaign. The political leaders of Unionism were, on 
balance, against continued membership, some vehemently 
so, such as the Reverend Ian Paisley. Constitutional 
Nationalists were broadly in favour of continued membership 
although the Republican movement was hostile, contending 
that the ‘Rich Man’s’ or ‘Capitalist Club’ was anathema to 
their conception of Irish sovereignty and culture.  
In the years following the UK’s decision to remain in the EEC, 
and through successive Treaties which slowly but ineluctably 
bound both the UK and the Republic of Ireland ever more 
deeply into the European ‘project’, Northern Ireland was on 
balance a net beneficiary, at least as measured in terms of the 
financial largesse emanating from Brussels. Support for 
peace and conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, as 
demonstrated in successive financial packages to help 
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sustain that commitment, amounted to a sizeable addition to 
London-directed public spending. All told, now in fourth 
iteration, the Special Funds in support of peace in Northern 
Ireland have exceeded £1bn over several decades. That 
support was matched by the political goodwill of the 
European Union, championed by successive European 
Commission Presidents, to aid a reconciliation among the 
divided people of Northern Ireland. Evoking the imagery of 
the post-war Franco-German rapprochement, the EU was 
swift to dig deep into its pockets to resolve the continent’s 
most intractable civil conflict (at least until the strife that 
consumed Yugoslavia in 1992). Hence, while the rest of the 
UK has witnessed a steady growth in ‘Euroscepticism’, 
manifest in the rising popular vote of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) (if not matched in seats in 
Westminster), debate in Northern Ireland was more muted. 
Certainly, while immigration has been evident locally, its 
scale has not been comparable to that in much of England, 
where the issue acquired far greater political salience.  
 
The Referendum 
After the largely unanticipated return of a majority 
Conservative Government in the 2015 General Election, with 
its manifesto commitment to hold an ‘In/Out’ referendum on 
UK membership of the EU, the tenor of the debate was 
ratcheted up sharply. Overall, for most of the referendum 
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campaign, the terms of the debate in Northern Ireland over 
the UK’s continued membership of the European Union 
paralleled those elsewhere in the UK. Above all, in terms of 
the economic dimension of the issue, both the local Remain 
and Leave campaigns deployed many of the same arguments 
as their respective national counterparts, suitably nuanced to 
reflect the region’s particular geography – sharing the UK’s 
only land border with another EU Member State - and 
relatively depressed socio-economic conditions, having 
being particularly adversely affected by the impact of UK 
Government austerity by dint of the Province’s heavy reliance 
on public sector employment, related activity and welfare 
dependency. 
As the campaign opened, politically, Northern Ireland was 
predictably largely polarised, chiefly but not exclusively 
around the traditional fault lines that have characterised 
politics here since before its creation as a separate political 
entity. That is, the cleavage of ethno-national cum religious 
identity quickly determined the central division on the 
‘European question’. Perhaps nowhere but in Northern 
Ireland, could one see a biblical quotation in support of Leave 
adorning a gable end wall: “And I heard another voice from 
heaven, saying, Come out of her, my people, that ye not be 
partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues.” 
(Book of Revelation Chapter 18, Verse 4) 
Hence, in the campaign, the demarcation was clear: the 
Nationalist parties (Sinn Fein and the Social & Democratic 
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Labour Party) were pro-Remain. For Sinn Fein, this 
represented a reversal of their stance in the 1970s since, 
among other factors, the party’s emergence as a party of 
Government in the North, and vying to be so in the South, 
meant that its all-Ireland credentials demanded nothing less 
than endorsement of the whole of Ireland to remain in the 
EU. Nationalists were joined by the bi-confessional Alliance 
Party of Northern Ireland and the smaller of the main 
Unionist parties, the Ulster Unionist Party, though there were 
notable detractors among its ranks, including former senior 
figures, from this official position. For Leave, the largest of 
the Unionist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 
was foremost in its calls for the UK to quit the EU. The DUP 
was joined by the smaller Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
and the local arm of UKIP. 
Ultimately, therefore, the majority of the electorate in 
Northern Ireland behaved largely by reference to the issue 
which defines politics here, namely, the constitutional 
question and the border with the Republic of Ireland. 
Overwhelmingly, Nationalist voters heeded their political 
leaders, and plumped for the Remain argument. Conversely, 
Unionist voters heeded the advice of the largest political 
party, including the voice of the First Minister of Northern 
Ireland, Arlene Foster, and voted for the Leave campaign. 
Clearly, however, a significant minority of the Unionist 
electorate were sufficiently moved by the arguments to 
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‘break ranks’ and opt for Remain. Hence, the overall result in 
Northern Ireland was: 
Remain 440,437 55.8% 
Leave 349,442 44.2% 
(In 11 of Northern Ireland’s 18 Parliamentary constituencies, Remain 
prevailed) 
Turnout 62.7% 
In comparison, the rest of the UK endorsed leaving the EU by 
a far greater margin 
Remain 
17,410,742 51.9% Leave 
16,141,241 48.1% 
Turnout 72.2% 
Matters Arising and Some Unfinished Business 
A string of ‘matters arising’ emanates from the referendum 
decision. As an issue, perhaps ‘the’ issue in Northern Ireland, 
‘the border’ displays three particular aspects both literally 
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and psychologically. Firstly, there is what sort of border? For 
supporters of EU membership, the prospect of a ‘hard’ border 
re-emerging between the two jurisdictions was very real. 
That there had never been a ‘wall’ or fence as such was 
overlooked. However, for much of the period following the 
creation of Northern Ireland as a separate political entity, its 
land border with the South was policed to varying degrees, 
including with military support during periods of terrorist 
insurgence (most notably during the Troubles 1969-1996), 
coupled with ‘normal’ customs officialdom monitoring cross-
border trade and movements. Hence, depending on the 
nature of the UK’s relationship with the rest of the EU after 
any secession, there has been much speculation as to 
whether customs controls would be reintroduced, and even 
an end to the passport and visa free movement associated 
with the Common Travel Area (CTA) which had been in 
operation since 1923 – save for the period from 1939 to 1952 
when, due to the national emergency of wartime conditions, 
cross border and indeed internal UK travel to/from Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain was restricted. Currently, the CTA 
involves an open borders arrangement that encompasses the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, together with the British Crown 
dependencies of the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. 
Essentially, the CTA is based on legally non-binding 
arrangements, and its internal borders are subject to minimal 
or non-existent border controls whereby borders can usually 
be crossed by British and Irish citizens with minimal identity 
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documents, with certain exceptions. Necessarily, to function 
effectively, maintenance of the British Isles CTA involves 
considerable co-operation on immigration matters between 
the UK and Irish authorities. 
Certainly, many advocates of Remain contended that a Brexit 
would necessitate the imposition of new controls though at 
whose instigation such measures would be introduced was 
less clear – would these be by the British Government, eager 
to staunch a possible flow by the ‘back door’ or would they be 
by the Irish Government at the behest of the European Union, 
eager to protect the Single Market and its attendant 
imposition of customs duties. Interestingly, there were mixed 
messages from advocates of Leave. For some hard-line 
Unionists, the introduction of a ‘hard’ border between the 
North and South of Ireland, would be greeted with glee, 
predicated on the logic that ‘dissident republican terrorism 
remains undefeated’ and that only with the most stringent of 
security measures could the authorities hope to combat it 
effectively. The Chair of the Vote Leave campaign was Lord 
Lawson, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer during Mrs 
Thatcher’s Government, though who fell out with bitterly – 
ironically over matters European, namely, Sterling 
shadowing the Deutschmark as a prelude to membership of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System in 1989. Lawson indicated that some controls 
appeared unavoidable, were the UK to leave the EU. For her 
part, Teresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern 
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Ireland, and fellow Leave campaigner, rejected all such 
notions, saying effectively that it would be ‘business as usual’ 
as regards the border – at least from a British perspective. 
A second dimension to the border question concerns its 
location. Formally, of course, this is clear in international law, 
if sometimes less so to the naked eye in situ for it is a long and 
meandering line on the map, some 499 km (310 miles) in 
length, and punctuated with countless minor roads and 
byways – indeed, roads, farmsteads and even buildings sit 
astride it. In practice, both from a political and logistical 
perspective, attempting to establish a hard border would be 
both costly and highly contentious. Perhaps the controversy 
which any reinstatement might occasion would be equalled 
only by the rumpus that would ensue, were the UK 
Government to adopt an internal hard border at Northern 
Ireland’s air and seaports for transit to and from Great Britain. 
Such a step would be anathema for Unionists. Quite apart 
from the added inconvenience such measures which 
necessarily entail for intra-UK travel, and the sense it would 
diminish their sense of Britishness in some way, the signal 
this would send to the Province – being interpreted as 
confirming Northern Ireland’s pariah status within the UK – 
would be loud and clear.  
In the words of one of the most celebrated Irish historians, 
James Camlin Beckett, the third dimension to the border 
question concerns ‘the border in the mind’. That is, amid the 
regular and sometimes violent clash of identities – 
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Protestant, Catholic, British, Irish, Northern Irish, Unionist, 
Nationalist, Loyalist, Republican – in Northern Ireland, what 
does the idea of Europe mean and what actual difference 
does it make? Specifically, as given expression in its nascent 
political cum governmental entity known first as a European 
Community, latterly post-Maastricht, as a European Union, 
Europe offered a form of sanctuary in which ancient and 
bitter enmities might be safely parked. Ever since both the 
UK and Republic of Ireland acceded to the Treaty of Rome in 
1972, at the height of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, there 
has been a substantial body of opinion among academics, 
politicians, advisers, policy makers and other commentators 
that both states’ subsequent shared membership of the 
Common Market provided a neutral space in which their 
intergovernmental relationship and efforts to find a solution 
to political and communal strife in Northern Ireland might 
bear fruit. In many ways, the Good Friday or Belfast 
Agreement of 1998 effectively removed the border from 
Northern Ireland politics and the immediate calculations and 
actions of its politicians. The agreement ensured the border 
was ‘detoxified’ as a potent issue bedevilling each and every 
move of the politicians. With Brexit, will atavistic tendencies, 
perhaps prematurely thought to have been safely diffused, or 
at least rendered largely impotent, be reignited? In truth, few 
locally speak with much affection or enthusiasm for their 
European identity but the ‘fact of Europe’ did at least afford a 
sense that one could possess several indeed multiple 
identities, and not feel threatened, effectively rendering the 
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border of 1921 as little more than a line on the map, and a 
slowly dissolving one at that. 
To all of these points must be added a further consideration. 
The status quo ante of British-Irish relations and identities 
pre-1973 is out of reach even if it were thought desirable. For 
its part, ‘Irish identity’ as enunciated through the organs of 
the Irish State and other key stakeholders and opinion 
formers such as the media in the Republic of Ireland have, in 
key respects, morphed in their acknowledgement that ‘being 
Irish and/or of Ireland’ meant more than exclusively being 
‘Catholic, Republican, and Insular’. Likewise, what might one 
say of British identity? Necessarily more complex than its 
Irish counterpart, given it encompasses several nations and a 
much larger and more diverse population, British identity has 
changed even more dramatically. Moreover, in Great 
Britain’s most restless corner, that of Scotland, a resurgent 
and distinct Scottish identity has been evident. It is 
increasingly alien from and indeed often hostile to that 
overarching sense of Britishness and has been given an 
enormous fillip by the albeit failed attempt at securing 
secession in the independence referendum of September 
2014 and, most recently, by the decisive vote in every 
electoral district of Scotland, in favour of remaining in the EU. 
Amid the renewed clamour in several quarters for the voters’ 
appetite for Scottish independence to be re-tested through a 
second plebiscite, as a means of safeguarding a continued or 
renewed Scottish representation in the EU, were such calls to 
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be heeded and the separatists to prevail in their intent, then 
what is left of Britishness? 
That family of nations in the United Kingdom, that British 
Union, cementing England, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland would be torn asunder – arguably a disaster all 
round but a truly cataclysmic prospect for those of avowedly 
British identity in the Province of Northern Ireland, who well 
may be left asking ‘still loyal, but to what?’, if the entity to 
which they cleave so strongly, is itself left broken. Certainly, 
Northern Ireland’s Unionists would remain unswervingly 
loyal to the British Crown and Union, whatever residual 
territorial entity (dubbed ‘rest of UK’ or ‘rUK’) that might 
survive a Scottish secession. However, the risk is that such 
professed continuing devotion to the Union would be an 
unrequited love, with England becoming increasingly weary 
of a restless Celtic fringe. What then the prospects for peace 
and stability in Northern Ireland? Even after twenty years of 
relative quiescence following the cessation of the ‘Troubles’, 
there remains a sense in which peace in Northern Ireland is 
rather too conditional, with little being needed to re-ignite 
dormant enmities. Hence, might Scotland’s breakaway be 







The referendum and the prospect of UK secession from the 
EU has also raised other questions. In common with its 
national counterpart in Whitehall, it is now clear that the 
devolved governmental machine at Stormont was woefully 
unprepared for what has come to pass. Yet, there are key 
issues that remain to be resolved and the role or scope for the 
devolved Government to influence and shape. 
First, in a region where a large proportion of the population 
remains heavily dependent on farming, the issue of how 
agriculture and fisheries will fare is prominent. Given the 
structural composition of the EU budget, Northern Ireland 
has been a major net beneficiary of farm support payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  In short, what 
regulatory and subsidies regime, if any, will be introduced 
if/when CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy no longer 
apply in Northern Ireland. Will the UK simply adopt a ‘cut and 
paste’ UK-version of CAP, at least to maintain the current 
subsidy regime and levels for a transition period? Will it revert 
to the old post-war deficiency payments system of income 
subsidies and price supports? And, whatever eventuates, will 
there be a devolved dimension to the arrangements allowing 
regional priorities and conditions to be taken into 
consideration by locally elected politicians? 
Second, in common with universities throughout the UK, 
there are major implications for the higher education sector 
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in Northern Ireland in relation to university research funding 
(Horizon 2020) and exchange programmes (such as 
Erasmus), as well as for the level of fees. While there have 
been calls for ‘business as usual’ and assurances that existing 
arrangements will be honoured, alarm has greeted the 
prospect of UK universities being locked out of a lucrative 
source of alternative research funds at a time when they are 
already facing financial stress. Moreover, even if mechanisms 
can be engineered to afford continued access to such funds, 
there is a fear that the levels of engagement in crucial 
research networks might be compromised by Brexit, not to 
mention rendering the UK a less attractive proposition for 
highly mobile and talented academics. 
Third, the nature of North-South Cooperation in Ireland will 
be altered dramatically by Brexit. To that end, Enda Kenny, 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, together with a 
swathe of mainly Nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland, 
has called for an all-Ireland forum to consider how best to 
manage the implications of Brexit. In response, Arlene 
Foster, the First Minister in Northern Ireland, has declared 
emphatically ‘no’ to the convening of an all-Ireland Brexit 
forum while the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, 
has said that a failure to do so could once again threaten the 
stability and continuity of the devolved arrangements, so 
painstakingly put back on track after several earlier episodes 
of trauma. By way of overcoming the impasse, it has been 
suggested that this role could be subsumed within the remit 
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of the existing North-South Ministerial Council, one strand of 
the three-stranded Belfast Agreement ‘confederal’ 
architecture that spans the British Isles, long viewed as a fig 
leaf for Northern Nationalists devoid of serious business or 
responsibility, but now suddenly in a pivotal role. Whatever 
the format for such intergovernmental negotiations, 
Stormont and Dublin might do well to agree on the nature of 
the border, henceforth. On the thorny issue of passport 
controls, while neither country is signatory to the Schengen 
Accord, neither has any appetite for introducing such 
controls. For these reasons among others, it will be important 
that representatives of the devolved Government along with 
their counterparts from Scotland and Wales are included in 
UK level deliberations over the country’s negotiating stance 
with the EU, once Article 50 is invoked. 
Fourth, long before the referendum, the devolved 
Government in Northern Ireland has been exploring the 
scope to secure a further measure of fiscal devolution, 
specifically, via variation in corporation tax. Under the 
‘Azores ruling’ by the European Court of Justice in 2006, on 
the scope and nature of variation in corporation taxation 
within Member States, Northern Ireland had pursued the 
option to lower corporation tax to equal the effective 
equivalent rate in the Republic of Ireland (12.5 per cent), 
commencing April 2018. It had been through tortuous 
negotiations with the UK Treasury to conclude the terms for 
the devolution of this key fiscal lever. However, the recent 
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cuts in the UK national rate of corporation tax (to 20 per cent, 
and due to fall further by 2020), it means that the competitive 
edge sought from a locally funded lower rate of corporation 
tax will be substantially blunted, though it would, at least, 
imply the earmarked funds to pay for such a reduction can 
now be wired into one or more of the many other deserving 
causes within Government. If not the whole UK, then could 
Northern Ireland experience a ‘soft’ Brexit, and remain as part 
of the EU’s Single Market – possibly along with Scotland – 
while the bulk of the UK remains outside? Ostensibly, the 
answer is no. However, while there is no precedent for such 
an outcome, there is no precedent for Brexit either. The EU 
will share the desire of both the UK and Irish Governments to 
avoid artificial distortions of trade and commerce on the 
island of Ireland. Moreover, in a post-Brexit scenario, 
depending on the nature of renegotiated terms of trade that 
might eventuate, does EU competition policy and other rules 
on state aid no longer apply or at least with the same force, 
thereby allowing Westminster to channel compensating 
funds to depressed areas. Again, Brussels will want to avoid a 
Dutch auction of beggar thy neighbour fiscal competition and 
any attendant downward pressure on national tax receipts. 
Similarly, given Northern Ireland has not experienced the 
intensity of the pressures of mass immigration experienced in 
England, there is also a concern around staff shortages in key 
sectors of the economy and public services, chief among 
which is the health service. 
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A fifth issue concerns the fate of EU legislation on the UK 
statute book and the process of untangling what has become 
a complex of legal provisions. That is, how much, if any, will 
remain, be scrapped or be amended and what role, if any, will 
be afforded to devolved fora such as the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (let alone local government)? Although references 
to subsidiarity have largely disappeared from the political 
discourse around the appropriate interface of European and 
national law making, the concept remains highly pertinent in 
the context of UK secession from Europe. With the very 
future integrity of the UK again in question, given popular 
attitudes in Scotland, a measure of flexibility and 
magnanimity on the part of London towards its restless 
territorial estate may well be both politically expedient and 
necessary if the fissiparous pressures of secession are not to 
prove irresistible. 
Assuming Brexit occurs, there has been much speculation 
around the possibility of contagion effects for neighbouring 
countries. In short, will others seek to follow suit, where the 
UK has plotted a new course? For the Republic of Ireland, 
there appears little enthusiasm to join the UK in heading for 
the exit. However, British secession does present the Irish 
Republic with positive opportunities as the sole English-
speaking country in the EU. Although the Celtic Tiger roars 
no more, Ireland’s bounce back from the nadir of the 2008 
financial crisis has still been remarkable, particularly in 
contrast to its more troubled southern European 
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counterparts. Will it, therefore, exploit its position as the new 
‘lynchpin’ between the EU and North America? Conversely, 
will any such gains be offset by adverse currency and banking 
sector developments vis-à-vis Ireland’s largest market, the 
UK? Cross-border trade, especially if Sterling remains 
depressed relative to the Euro, will occasion a dramatic net 
flow northwards. Similar conditions previously in 2009 had a 
crippling effect on border businesses and the Irish Exchequer, 
notably from depressed VAT receipts, when Sterling was last 
at near parity with the Euro. For Northern Ireland’s exporters, 
that same currency movement offers a potential boon, both 
into the EU as well as further afield. Whether they will then 
be able to exploit it remains to be seen. 
 
Outlook 
The outcome of the UK’s referendum on continued 
membership of the European Union has delivered a decisive 
message. While the details of how and when or even if any 
secession takes effect, and the nature of the subsequent UK-
EU relationship, remain to be determined, the implications 
for the whole country will be profound. For Northern Ireland, 
with its land border adjoining the Republic of Ireland, the 
impact of Brexit will have greater ramifications. It will be in 
the interests of both parts of Ireland, North and South, and 
their respective sovereign governments, to explore how best 
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1. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Aughey, Emeritus 
Professor, Ulster University, for his helpful advice in advance 




7. Moving Towards a Dissolved or 
Strengthened Union? 
Arjan H. Schakel 
 
The Scottish National Party (SNP) stated in its manifesto for 
the May 2016 Scottish Parliament election that it would 
consider holding a second independence referendum if there 
was a material change of circumstances, such as the UK 
leaving the EU. A slight majority (51.9 per cent) voted in 
favour of leaving the European Union (EU) but in Scotland a 
clear majority (62.0 per cent) wants to remain in the EU. Since 
then there is an intensive political debate and negotiation 
about the relations between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. What is the likely 
outcome of this debate? Is Scotland wandering on the path of 
secession? 
In contrast to what many people would think, I will argue that 
a strengthened Union is a more likely scenario than a 
dissolved Union. Such a counterintuitive conclusion is based 
on an assessment of the causal drivers of devolution in the 
UK. Therefore, I will explore whether external (European 
integration) or internal (nationalist parties) pressures are 
driving Scottish nationalism. I will put Scotland’s autonomy 
arrangement in a comparative perspective to see if further 
decentralisation would be possible and what it could look like. 
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It appears that Scotland has many self-rule powers but shared 
rule with England and the other devolved administrations is 
underdeveloped. My analysis suggests that Scottish 
independence is unlikely to happen. Rather, more 
devolution, involving a development of shared rule, will 
strengthen the Union with England.  
 
European Integration and Regionalism 
European integration is often portrayed as a story of Member 
States pooling their authority to collaboratively decide and 
implement policy. But there is another story to European 
integration: a widening and deepening Europe coincides with 
a trend of increasing regionalism. This was already observed 
in the early 1990s by Gary Marks (1992), who studied the 
reforms of the European Community’s structural funds policy 
in the course of the Maastricht Treaty. A state-level approach 
could neither satisfactorily explain why there had been 
fundamental innovations in the administration of structural 
funds nor account for the considerable growth of funding. 
Subnational governments had become increasingly 
important for implementing EU policy most notably cohesion 
policy and structural funds (Marks 1993, 392). The 
involvement of regions in European structural policy went 
along with calls for more regional authority (Jones and 
Keating 1995; Jeffery 1997), and with the creation of the 
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Single European Market regions became less economically 
reliant on domestic markets. Some scholars postulated a 
vision of a ‘Europe of the regions’, or more modestly, a 
‘Europe with the regions’ in which power was devolved 
upwards to the European level or downwards to the regional 
tier (Piattoni, 2009). 
What is the nature of European integration and regionalism 
in the UK? To what extent can devolution in the UK be related 
to the process of European integration?  
The Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al. 2016) 
allows me to systematically trace trends in decentralisation 
of government authority across countries and time. The RAI 
breaks down regional authority into two dimensions. Self-rule 
is the power exercised by a regional government over citizens 
within its territory. For example, the German Länder have the 
competences to shape policy with regard to culture, 
education, universities and the police. Shared rule is the 
authority of a regional government co-exercised in the 
country as a whole. In Germany, shared rule takes two forms. 
The executive governments of the Länder appoint 
representatives in the Bundesrat, which is an upper chamber 
of parliament with veto powers over many federal laws. The 
Länder can also shape national policy and coordinate policies 
through Ministerkonferenzen in which ministers of the Länder 
meet with federal ministers.  
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The RAI provides autonomy scores for regional governments 
in 81 countries between 1950 and 2010. Figure 1 displays 
average RAI scores for four groups of countries showing that 
regional authority has increased over time. In the EU, in ‘west 
old democracies’ (i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands) average regional authority increased slightly 
from ten in 1950 to almost sixteen in 2010. Regional authority 
also increased in countries which democratised (e.g. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain) and in countries anticipating EU 
membership (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Romania).  
 
Figure 1: Average regional authority index scores for four groups of 
countries between 1950 and 2010. 
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The rise of regional authority in EU countries suggests a 
causal link between European integration and 
decentralisation processes. However, regional authority has 
also increased in countries outside the EU. The average RAI 
score for OECD non-EU countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, US) increased from twelve points in 1950 to 15 
points in 2010. This indicates a global rather than a European-
specific decentralisation trend and raises the question for 
other causes of regionalism. The next section, therefore, 
looks into nationalist parties as drivers for decentralisation. 
What is the role of the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru (PC) 
in Wales for devolution in the UK? 
 
Regionalist Parties and Regionalism 
Alongside a coinciding trend of European integration and 
decentralisation reforms, scholars have also noted a rise in 
nationalist (often also referred to as regionalist) parties, 
especially since the 1970s (De Winter et al. 2006; Matthias 
2006). The electoral development of regionalist parties – 
defined as parties which prioritise autonomy claims – is 
displayed in Figure 2. Clearly, these parties are on the rise in 




Figure 2: Average regionalist party strength in national and regional 
elections.  
Notes: Average regionalist party strength is derived by dividing the sum 
of regional vote shares for all regionalist parties by the total number of 
elections for each decade and the average includes elections where 
regionalist parties did not participate. 
Decentralisation is not only promoted by European 
integration but also by regionalist parties, as in the UK. This 
raises the question how European integration, 
decentralisation and regionalist parties are connected to 
each other.  
Regionalist parties can be distinguished between parties that 
challenge the unity of the state and want to become an 
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independent country (secessionist parties) and those who do 
not challenge the unity of state but seek more autonomy 
(autonomist parties). Both types of parties have seen their 
average vote share increasing but especially secessionist 
parties have been on the rise in the 2000s (Figure 2). Not only 
have regionalist parties become electorally stronger but also 
more radical. Previous research has shown that 
decentralisation reforms foster a radicalisation of regionalist 
parties. A change in RAI score from 1 to 20 increases the 
probability that a regionalist party is a secessionist party from 
10 per cent to 60 per cent (Massetti and Schakel 2013). Hence, 
it appears that European integration alone is not a likely 
driver for devolution in the UK but that electorally growing 
and ideologically radicalising regionalist parties are a more 
likely cause. 
 
European Integration, Regionalist Parties and a 
Dissolving United Kingdom 
In order to gain insight on the question whether European 
integration and/or regionalist parties are driving devolution, I 
look at regional variation in voting during the Brexit 
referendum and I track the electoral developments of the 
main regionalist parties in Scotland (SNP) and Wales (PC). In 
Wales, 52.5 per cent of the voters opted for Leave which is 
very close to the result in England (53.4 per cent). In Scotland, 
however, 62.0 per cent of the voters wanted to remain in the 
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EU. This result indicates that Scotland is far more Europhile 
than the rest of the UK (in Northern Ireland 55.8 per cent of 
the voters want to remain in the EU).  
The stark contrast in the referendum result has led to a 
discussion whether there should be a second referendum on 
Scottish independence. Public opinion towards the EU is used 
by the SNP as a legitimation to have a second independence 
referendum and in this way European integration may be 
indirectly furthering devolution in the UK. But it is clear that 
the impact of European integration is mediated by regionalist 
parties. This point is further illustrated by having a look at 
Wales where a clear majority of voters want to leave the EU. 
This is a surprising result considering that at a very 
conservative estimate Wales enjoys an annual net benefit of 
£245 million from the UK’s relationship with the EU. Richard 
Wyn Jones (2016) ascribes this remarkable result to a failure 
of Welsh politicians to inform voters about the benefits of EU 
membership.  
Wyn Jones’ explanation hints that the impact of European 
integration on devolution in the UK is most likely an indirect 
one and is mediated by regionalist parties which can use 
public opinion towards the EU as a legitimation for further 
decentralisation reforms. The extent to which regionalist 
parties do so will depend on whether they think they will 
electorally benefit from ‘exploiting’ the EU. This is far more 
likely for the SNP than for the PC because in Wales voters 
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tend to be more Eurosceptic. The SNP can benefit from 
emphasising European issues whereas PC cannot.  
From Table 1 one can observe that the electoral results for PC 
are quite stable over time, no matter whether PC is in regional 
government or not. In Scotland, however, the SNP has been 
on the rise and since 2011, when it formed a single-party 
government, it is the dominant party in Scotland. Thanks to 
a recent referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 and 
further helped by Brexit, decentralisation demands have 
intensified far more in Scotland than in Wales. However, in 
the case when the SNP manages to extract more authority 
from London, my argument is that a strengthened Union is 
more likely than a dissolved Union. 
Table 1: Electoral results for the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. 
Notes: Shown are the electoral results for PC and SNP in Holyrood 
(Scottish Parliament), Cardiff (Welsh Assembly) and Westminster 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom) elections. 129 seats are at stake in 
Holyrood elections and 59 (72 for 1997-2001) seats are at stake in 
Westminster elections. 60 seats are at stake in Cardiff elections and 40 
seats are at stake in Westminster elections. Vote percentages for 
Westminster elections refer to the votes won in Scotland and Wales. 
Figures in bold indicate the elections when the regionalist party was 
forming regional executive government. 
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Scotland’s Autonomy Arrangement 
In order to substantiate my argument, I will first discuss 
Scotland’s autonomy arrangement in detail to identify the 
areas in which further devolution is likely. Three 
considerations are important for the question, whether the 
UK is moving towards a dissolved or strengthened Union. 
First, is a further decentralisation of authority possible for 
Scotland or does more devolution automatically entail 
secession? And if further decentralisation reforms are 
possible, in which areas? Second, devolution is essentially a 
bargaining process between regionalist and statewide parties 
and thereby the preferences of these parties are likely to 
inform possible decentralisation reforms. Third, once there is 
room for further decentralisation and the preferences of 
parties are favourable towards more devolution then the 
question pops-up what the new autonomy arrangement will 
look like?  
Starting with the first consideration, we can usefully employ 
the Regional Authority Index again. Scotland’s autonomy is 
far reaching (Table 2). The region has its own parliament 
which elects its own executive (representation) and which can 
make laws on a wide variety of policies except immigration 
(policy scope) without interference from central government 
(institutional depth). Further decentralisation on the self-rule 
dimension is conceivable, especially on the fiscal side. 
Scotland can set a rate on income tax (three pence in the 
pound) (tax autonomy) but has never used this power and 
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when the region would like to borrow it can only do so 
through national government (borrowing autonomy). 
Table 2: Scotland’s autonomy arrangement compared to maximum 
scores. 
Space for further devolution can be especially found on the 
shared rule side of the autonomy arrangement. Whereas 
Scotland has the institutional means to voice its opinion with 
regard to UK legislation in the region (law making) and has, in 
practice, a veto on its own constitutional status through the 
Sewel convention, it lacks powers on executive and fiscal 
matters. Intergovernmental meetings between London and 
Edinburgh are restricted to non-binding bilateral and inter-
departmental concordats and pacts, and Scotland has 
virtually no say or powers to alter the Barnett formula which 
regulates the unconditional fiscal grant from the UK to 
Scottish government. In sum, future decentralisation reforms 
are likely to include fiscal reforms and most ‘gains’ can be 
achieved with regard to shared rule. 
The SNP realises that Scotland is lacking competences in 
raising taxes and in citizenship and immigration and states 
that it would like to have competences over these policies 
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(SNP 2013). None of the three main statewide parties are in 
favour of an independent Scotland but they do support 
further devolution to Scotland, in particular with regard to 
income tax and welfare (attendance allowances, housing 
benefits and supplements) (Conservatives 2014; Labour 
2014; Liberal Democrats 2014). Given the convergence 
between the preferences of the SNP on one side and the 
three major statewide parties on the other side, it is not 
surprising that the Scotland Act 2016 gives Scotland the 
power to set income tax rates and bands and the right to 
receive half of the revenues of value added taxes raised in 
Scotland. In addition, the Scotland Act 2016 extends the 
powers over employment support and universal credit, and 
Scotland can now top-up cuts to tax credits specified in 
Westminster legislation. In other words, the space for 
increased autonomy on self-rule has been filled up with the 
latest Scotland Act of 2016 with the exception of immigration 
and citizenship. Hence, more self-rule is hardly conceivable 
unless Scotland, indeed, secedes.  
This is something the SNP does not want despite the fact that 
they use the word ‘independence’ constantly. In the 
document Scotland’s Future, the SNP clearly outlines that it 
wants to keep five Unions. The party does not want to leave 
the EU, wants to remain in NATO, wants to keep the Pound 
Sterling and the monarchy, and wants to keep up a social 
union with the rest of the UK (SNP 2013). What the SNP 
envisages as independence can be better described by ‘full 
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autonomy’ or ‘autonomy to the maximum’ rather than 
secession because keeping the Pound, the monarchy and the 
welfare state of the UK necessarily implies remaining part of 
the Union.  
The need for intergovernmental meetings is acknowledged 
by the three statewide parties. The Conservatives would like 
to have a ‘Committee of all the Parliaments and Assemblies 
of the United Kingdom’ which ‘should be created to consider 
the developing role of the United Kingdom, its Parliaments 
and Assemblies and their respective powers, representation 
and financing’ (Conservatives 2014). This comes very close to 
what the Liberal Democrats (2014) suggest: ‘The Secretary of 
State for Scotland should convene a meeting after the 
referendum, within thirty days, where parties and wider 
interests can meet. Its aim should be to secure a consensus 
for the further extension of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’. More formalised intergovernmental meetings 
are proposed by the Labour Party (2014, 5) which envisages 
‘Partnership arrangements between Parliaments and 
Governments whose responsibilities will inevitably overlap 
should be established, so that they work together for the 
common good, safeguarding civil and political rights, and 
promoting social and economic rights such as welfare and full 
employment. There is a strong case for giving partnership 
arrangements a legal existence, in the form of statutory 
obligations on both administrations to co-operate in the public 
interest, or through the creation of a formal Intergovernmental 
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Council or its equivalent with the duty to hold regular meetings’ 
(emphasis added).  
The need for cooperation between the UK governments is 
also acknowledged by the SNP but the party does use the 
‘lingo’ normally reserved for international relations between 
countries: 
With our immediate neighbours in the British Isles and 
Northern Europe, independence will create opportunities for 
co-operation, with future governments able to engage as 
equals in partnerships that enhance Scotland’s position in 
relation to important policy areas including energy, tourism, 
security and culture. (SNP 2013, 212) 
Independence will allow Scotland and the rest of the UK to 
work together on matters of common interest, as nations do 
across the world. This will include current cross-border 
arrangements on health treatments, combating serious and 
organised crime and terrorism and administrative 
arrangements to deliver services to the people of Scotland 
and the rest of the UK when this makes sense (ibid., 216; 
emphasis added). 
Scotland’s most important diplomatic relationships will be 
with the rest of the UK and Ireland, reflecting cultural history 
and family ties, shared interests in trade, security and 
common travel. The current Scottish Government plans a 
substantial diplomatic presence in both London and Dublin 
and will be active participants in the British-Irish Council, the 
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secretariat of which is already based in Edinburgh (ibid; 
emphasis added). 
In sum, party preferences converge on the need for 
intergovernmental meetings to coordinate policy but they 
remain silent on how these intergovernmental relations 
should look like, which form it should take and which policies 
it should cover. The Scotland Act 2016 is almost exclusively 
concerned with self-rule powers whilst shared rule is not 
addressed. Any further devolution is, therefore, most likely to 
involve intergovernmental meetings. The discussion on self-
rule already revealed that dissolution is not likely to happen 
because, in the end, the SNP wants to keep the monetary, 
monarchic, and social Union with the rest of the UK. Further 
decentralisation is conceivable with regard to shared rule but 
will these kind of reforms strengthen or weaken the Union(s)? 
 
Scenarios for Scotland’s Autonomy Arrangement 
Scotland is an autonomous region which means that it has its 
own and unique autonomy arrangement within a country. 
This is quite common for regions with electorally strong 
regionalist parties. In Table 3, the Scottish shared rule 
arrangement is compared to those of its peers, that is other 
special autonomous regions in Europe. Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Aland and Faroe Islands score low for law making 
and constitutional reform, while Scotland has comparatively 
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high scores. In case of fiscal control, Bolzano-Bozen and Valle 
d’Aosta can also inform possible decentralisation reforms for 
Scotland. I will discuss each shared rule dimension in turn. 
Table 3: Scotland’s autonomy arrangement (shared rule) compared to 
other autonomous regions in Europe. 
With regard to national law making Scotland can veto 
Westminster laws through the Sewel convention which 
stipulates that the UK Parliament will not legislate with 
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the 
devolved legislature. According to the Sewel convention, 
three categories of provision are not enacted in primary 
legislation at Westminster unless the devolved assemblies 
give their consent: (1) provisions that would be within the 
legislative competence of the devolved executives; (2) 
provisions that would extend the executive competence of 
the devolved assemblies; and (3) provisions that would alter 
the legislative competence of the devolved assemblies. The 
Sewel convention effectively grants Scotland a veto on its 
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own autonomy arrangement and this is the maximum which 
can be achieved.  
Most autonomous regions, including Scotland, do not have a 
say in national and regional borrowing except for the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. These two regions exercise borrowing 
control through a multilateral council on fiscal policy and 
finance (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera). However, this 
mix of multilateral and bilateral shared rule seems to be a 
Spanish exception. Borrowing control is conceivable for 
Scotland but in a multilateral rather than a bilateral format, 
which would require that the UK government regularly meets 
with the devolved governments to take binding decisions on 
government borrowing. 
All in all, it seems that most scope for further devolution is in 
executive control and fiscal control. What decentralisation 
reforms can be conceived in relation to executive control? This 
could involve upgrading to the Joint Ministerial Committees 
by regular meetings where formal and binding decisions are 
taken on a wide range of policies, and, when desired because 
of diverging regional interests, the devolved governments 
can decide to participate in binding legislation or not.1 
Scotland’s fiscal control arrangement stands in stark contrast 
with those for other autonomous regions (Table 3). Scotland 
receives most of its income through an unconditional grant 
from the UK government determined by the Barnett formula 
which gives the devolved administrations a proportionate 
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share of spending on comparable functions in England, given 
their populations compared to England. The Barnett formula 
falls under the complete purview of the Treasury. The 
devolved administrations are consulted on an ad hoc basis 
and in case of disagreement, the devolved administration, or 
Secretary of State can pursue the issue with the Treasury but 
the Treasury makes the decisions. Alternative fiscal control 
arrangements can be found in Bolzano-Bozen and Valle 
d’Aosta which are consulted on and in Aland and Faroe 
Islands which can negotiate the tax revenues allocated to 
their region. The Basque Country has a special fiscal 
agreement (Concierto) with the central government whereby 
the region administers and collects taxes and pays a 
contribution (cupo) to the central government for the services 
provided by central government in the region. In addition, 
fiscal matters are discussed in a multilateral fashion in the 
council on fiscal policy and finance. 
 
Conclusion 
A comparative ‘global’ perspective, as well as a UK-focused 
‘local’ study, strongly suggest that electorally strong and 
radicalising regionalist parties are a major cause for 
decentralisation reforms. European integration is at most an 
intermediating factor as regionalist parties may use ‘Europe’ 
or the ‘European Union’ as a legitimation to further their 
autonomy demands. A dissolving UK is unlikely to happen 
120 
 
because a closer look at how the SNP understands 
independence reveals that they would like Scotland to be in a 
monetary, monarchical, and social welfare Union with the 
UK, as well as in a defense and international Union with 
NATO and the EU. The preferences of the SNP and the three 
statewide parties, that is Conservatives, Liberal Democrats 
and Labour, clearly converge on further devolution reforms, 
especially with regard to tax powers and welfare policy. In the 
aftermath of the referendum on Scottish independence this 
is exactly what happened with the adoption of the Scotland 
Act 2016. While it is highly likely that the Union will not 
dissolve, this still leaves open the possibility that the Union 
will become weaker. 
A comparison of Scotland’s autonomy arrangement to those 
of other autonomous regions illustrates that further 
decentralisation is conceivable with regard to shared rule, in 
particular regarding borrowing, executive and fiscal control. 
However, when devolution proceeds in those realms, it could 
actually mean that the Union will be strengthened because it 
would require regular and formal meetings between the 
devolved administrations and the UK governments to arrive 
at binding decisions on national and regional borrowing, UK 
legislation and fiscal transfers from Westminster to the 
regions.  
The Brexit negotiations will involve intense and frequent 
negotiations between the UK government and the EU but will 
also involve the devolved administrations. In practice, the 
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Joint Ministerial Committee on European Affairs is the only 
channel through which Scotland can try to negotiate a 
favourable position for itself after a Brexit. The upshot is that 
shared rule will increase and that the UK is bound to move 
towards a strengthened Union. 
 
References 
Christiansen, T. (1996) Second thoughts on Europe’s ‘third 
level’: the European Union’s committee of the regions. Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism, 26 (1): 93-114. 
Conservatives (2014) Commission on the future governance of 
Scotland. Glasgow: Scottish Conservatives.  
De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino, M., Cachafeiro, R. (eds.) (2006) 
Autonomist parties in Europe:identity politics and the revival 
of the territorial cleavage. Barecolona: Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona, Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus.  
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A. H., Chapman-Osterkatz, 
S., Niedzwiecki, S., and Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2016) 
Measuring regional authority. Volume I: A postfunctionalist 
theory of governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jeffery, C. (1997) The regional dimension of the European 
Union. Towards a third level in Europe? London: Frank Cass. 
122 
 
Jones, B. and Keating, M. (1995) The European Union and the 
regions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Labour (2014) Power for a purpose. Strengthening 
accountability and empowering people. Glasgow: Scottish 
Labour.  
Liberal Democrats (2014) Campbell II. The second report of 
the Home Rule and Community Rule Commission. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Liberal Democrats.  
Marks, G. (1992) Structural policy in the European 
Community. In: Sbragia, A. M. (ed.) Europolitics. Institutions 
and policymaking in the ‘new’ European Community. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 191-225.  
Marks, G. (1993) Structural policy and multi-level governance 
in the EC. In: Cafruny, A. W. and Rosenthal, G. G. (eds.) The 
state of the European Community: the Maastricht debate and 
beyond. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 391-411. 
Massetti, E. and Schakel, A. H. (2013) Ideology matters: why 
decentralization has a differentiated effect on regionalist 
parties’ fortunes in Western democracies. European Journal of 
Political Research, 52 (6): 797-821. 
Matthias, J. (2006) Regions and Regional Politics in Europe. 




Morata, F. (1992) Regions and the European Community: a 
comparative analysis of four Spanish regions. Regional and 
Federal Studies, 2 (1-2): 187-216.  
Piattoni, S. (2009) Multilevel governance: a historical and 
conceptual analysis. Journal of European Integration, 31 (2): 
163-180. 
Scottish National Party (2013) Scotland’s future. Your guide 
to an independent Scotland. Edinburgh: The Scottish 
Government.  
Wyn Jones, R. (2016) Why did Wales shoot itself in the foot in 
this referendum? The Guardian online, 27 June 2016. 




1. After devolution a memorandum of understanding was 
signed in 1999 to set up a Joint Ministerial Committee which 
entitles the regional governments to consult with the UK 
government on legislation that impinges on them or to 
resolve disputes between regional and UK governments. 
With the exception of the EU affairs committee, the JMC did 
not meet regularly until 2008. However, consultations are 
non-binding and intergovernmental relations mainly take 
place through non-binding and inter-departmental 
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